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1 Introduction 
The Mekong River – the Mother of Rivers – runs through some of the 
least developed and most war-torn areas in the world. On its way from 
the Tibetan plateau in China to the South China sea, the river passes 
through the Yunnan Province in Southwestern China, forms the border 
between Burma and Lao PDR and subsequently between Thailand and 
Lao PDR, runs through parts of the latter, flows into and through Cam-
bodia, and splits up into a delta in southern Vietnam before it finally 
empties into the sea. During the dry season, the discharge may be as little 
at 2000 m3/second, whilst in the wet season, it may swell to an enormous 
60,000 m3/second (Öjendal 2000:15). The basin is the home of approxi-
mately 70 million people of various nationalities and cultures. How may 
the resources offered by the mighty Mekong River and its tributaries be 
managed to the benefit of adjacent states and peoples? 
This study is concerned with international river management. It is an 
analysis of regime effectiveness, yet there are a number of both theoreti-
cal and empirical perspectives which also might have been fruitful to 
apply to the case of the Mekong River. To deal with the politics of the 
Mekong River, the four lower riparians, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia 
and Vietnam, cooperate within an organisation called the Mekong River 
Commission, whilst Burma and China hold observer status. The organisa-
tion is based on the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin signed in 1995, but the coopera-
tion dates back to 1957 when the Mekong Committee was established 
with the assistance of the UN. Since then, the four lower riparians have 
cooperated to a lesser or greater extent throughout the American warfare 
on Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian territory, communist coups and 
rule, the Cold War and market liberalisation programs. This report aims 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the regime shaped by this cooperation: 
whether it affects the policies of the riparians, and how the riparians af-
fect the regime.  
1.1 The geopolitical setting of the Mekong River 
The Mekong River1 runs through, or borders, six sovereign states: China, 
Burma, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam. China is the biggest 
riparian, in terms of both population and area, and is the extreme up-
stream state. The river barely touches Burma, a closed military dictator-
ship with only 265 km border along the Mekong, before it enters the 
Lower Mekong Basin and forms the border between Thailand and Lao 
PDR. Thailand is the wealthiest of the lower riparians, one of two region-
al powers, and hosts the only somewhat functioning democracy in the 
region. Lao PDR is a landlocked country, one of the smallest and least 
developed riparians, and a one-party socialist state. The Mekong River 
runs through almost the entire country before it enters Cambodia, the 
other democracy, albeit malfunctioning, in the region. Cambodia suffers 
from decades of turmoil and political unrest which have prevented eco-
nomic and political development. She is home to the Tonle Sap (The 
Great Lake), the biggest freshwater body in Southeast Asia. Finally, the 
Mekong River turns into a delta and enters Vietnam, a one-party socialist 
state, and the other regional power in mainland Southeast Asia.  
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Map 1 Mainland Southeast Asia 
The potential conflicts over the river originate in different wishes of how 
to use the water: development of hydropower dams might alter the natural 
flow pattern. Sudden releases of substantial amounts of water may flush 
away river banks and river bank gardens, while the dams might store the 
nutritious silt that is normally spread with the annual flooding. Dams 
downstream will prevent mitigating fish from reaching further upstream 
of the river. Large irrigation projects withdraw water from the river sys-
tem, which might affect fisheries and agriculture. Inter-basin transfers of 
water have similar consequences. Also navigation projects that include 
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dredging of the river and blasting of river banks will alter the natural tur-
bulence and speed of the river, which in turn could have consequences for 
the river banks as well as the river’s ecology and fish population. There 
are other examples of the cross-cutting interests that could have been 
mentioned, but these are meant to illustrate the complexity of the devel-
opment interests in the region, and how gain in one sector might mean 
sacrifice in another. 
1.2 Purpose, research questions and delimitations 
1.1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to shed light on what the Mekong River 
regime has accomplished and what promotes and hinders the performance 
of the regime. It is rooted in an interest for shared, specific, natural 
resources such as rivers and lakes, combined with a fascination for both 
China and Southeast Asia and curiosity about cooperation on policies in a 
setting characterised by cultural and political diversity. The purpose is 
thus to elaborate on a rather specific case where the organisation of data 
is guided by a previously established theoretical framework for analysing 
regime effectiveness, as presented by Arild Underdal (2002). However, 
the report also aims to draw conclusions that might be useful for future 
studies in the same or similar settings either in the developing world, or 
relating to shared natural resources – but above all, it seeks to understand 
the dynamics amongst the Mekong River riparians that leads, or leads 
not, to fruitful cooperation. 
1.2.2 Research questions 
The research questions present the focus of this study, and guide both the 
formation of the hypotheses and the discussion and analysis of the report. 
They are as follows: 
1. Is the Mekong River regime an effective regime? How?  
a. Why, why not? 
b. How does the geopolitical location of the regime members 
affect their role in the regime? 
c. What is the impact of China not being a member of the regime? 
Question 1) aims to determine whether the Mekong River regime has 
accomplished anything, and what influence the regime might have on the 
riparians. This question is the overall question for the report and identi-
fies the dependent variable of the study, the regime effectiveness. It will 
also be compared to its effectiveness in an earlier phase of the regime, as 
explained in section 0. The other research questions are meant to explain 
the effectiveness or lack thereof, and hence lead to the independent 
variables/explanatory framework. Research question 1a) sheds light on 
why or why not the regime is effective, through discussing the 
intellectual challenges of river basin management, the institutional setting 
of the Mekong River regime and how other forms of cooperation influ-
ences the regime. Question 1b) aims to assess how the geopolitical loca-
tion of the riparian regime members influence their roles within the re-
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gime, with an attempt to suggest who might act as pushers and laggards 
for enhanced cooperation. Research question 1c) attempts to determine 
the impact of the non-membership of a significant riparian, China, and 
how her position influences the regime. The research questions of this 
study seek to address both the regime and the circumstances in which it 
operates to explain its effectiveness or lack thereof. They link to the 
hypotheses deducted from the theoretical, explanatory framework in 
chapter 2. 
1.2.3 Delimitations 
This report has three main delimitations. Firstly, the study will not ad-
dress any topics related to Burma, because the current situation in Burma 
is extremely difficult and sensitive, and information is not easily avail-
able. This does not, however, have severe impacts on the study, as the 
Mekong River basin only briefly covers Burmese territory, and as Burma 
has been neither an active part of the cooperation, nor influential in 
policies relating to the Mekong River. Secondly, the report will focus on 
the Yunnan province in China, although the Mekong River runs through 
both the Tibetan Autonomous Region and Qinghai province. This is be-
cause Yunnan borders the other riparians, and because the current Chin-
ese development on the mainstream of the Mekong River takes place 
mainly within Yunnan. The report will off course also relate to the 
Chinese central authorities in Beijing. Thirdly, the study will focus on the 
period from 1995 until the end of 2004, although this will be further 
restricted through the operationalisation of the dependent variable. The 
lower time limit is based on the signing of the 1995 Agreement, whilst 
the upper limit is based on availability of material. 
1.3 Structure of the report 
The report consists of six chapters including this introduction. The next 
chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the report, operationalises 
and explains the dependent variable and the explanatory framework. The 
hypotheses are stated as the outline of the explanatory framework 
proceeds, but also presented together at the end of the chapter to provide 
an overview of the expectations for the regime and relate them to the 
research questions and to each other. The chapter is concluded by a 
model which illustrates and summarises how the theory is applied to the 
case of the Mekong River regime, indicating where the hypotheses fit 
into the framework. The third chapter is concerned with the methodology 
of the study. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the methods 
used, and emphasises their implications for the results of the study. In the 
fourth chapter, the empirical background and findings are described in a 
manner as accurate and detailed as possible. The chapter is divided into 
several sections, starting by giving details of the Mekong River itself, 
before it turns to the Mekong River Commission. The next part of the 
chapter deals with the five riparians in this study, where the political 
background, the geography, the political relations to the region for the 
country at stake, and the relationship to and the perceptions of the 
Mekong River Commission are accounted for. The part on each riparian 
is concluded by a small summary of my main impression of the country 
in relation to the Mekong River regime. The fifth chapter addresses the 
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research questions and the hypotheses, and relates them to the empirical 
background and findings from chapter four. The chapter is organised into 
four parts, each discussing one of the research questions and the relevant 
hypotheses for this question. A brief summary bridges the chapter to its 
last section, which comments on the concept of effectiveness and on the 
applicability of the theoretical framework that has been used to organise 
the study to the reality of the Mekong River regime. Chapter six is the 
final chapter, where a few concluding remarks are made. 
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2 Theoretical background and explanatory 
framework 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework which the study rests 
upon. It starts by discussing what international institutions are, and how 
the Mekong case fits into the distinction between organisations and 
regimes. The subsequent section explains the theoretical model that forms 
the framework for the analysis, incorporating an assessment of the con-
cept of effectiveness and an explanation of which understanding of it will 
be used in this report and why. A justification for the inclusion of China 
in the analysis of the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is then 
offered, followed by a discussion of the operationalisation of the depend-
ent variable. Subsequently, the standard of measurement which the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is to be compared to is consid-
ered. The next section outlines the three main components of the explan-
atory framework: the problem malignity, the problems solving capacity, 
and other relevant organisations and institutions, and applies them to the 
case of the Mekong River regime. The hypotheses are presented under 
the relevant parts as the section progresses to root them firmly within the 
explanatory framework. Finally, all the hypotheses are listed, the connec-
tions to the research questions are explained, and the choice of these 
particular hypotheses is justified. The chapter is concluded by a figure 
providing an overview of the explanatory framework, indicating the 
location of the hypotheses. 
2.1 International Institutions 
International institutions can be divided into three groups: bureaucratic 
organisations, regimes, and conventions (Keohane, Haas, and Levy 
1993:5). The first ones are organisations, with secretariats, headquarters 
and staff, whilst conventions are informal practices, and regimes are 
somehow between the two. The two terms institutions and regimes are 
sometimes used interchangeably, especially in writings on international 
political economy (Gilpin 2001:83), however, the distinction is of signifi-
cance for this study. Institutions is a much wider term, for example 
shown by Bernauer’s (1995:352) definition where ‘institutions are […] 
defined as sets of international regulations and organizations’. The term 
institution covers both cases of cooperation where there is as specific 
body or organisation, and cases where the agreements are based only on 
regulations. The width of this term requires this study to use the more 
precise terms organisations and regimes. Organisations frequently 
possess legal personalities, albeit restricted by their objects and functions 
(Bindschedler 1999:1299). They may also have material manifestations. 
A regime, however, is defined by Krasner (1983:2) as:  
sets of implicit of explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined 
in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
of proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are pre-
vailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.  
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This definition makes it clear that a regime does not require a physical 
manifestation – an implicit or explicit agreement on a specific area is 
sufficient, and a regime does hence not require an organisation to justly 
be called a regime. There is an important nuance incorporated into the 
wordings of the definition: ‘ “actors” expectations converge…’ (italics 
added), implying that the actors have similar, but not necessarily identi-
cal, ideas about the scope of the regime. This reservation is of signifi-
cance when the definition is applied to real cases, since completely cor-
responding understandings are not required by the definition.  
But how can the parties of the regime know that they are of the same 
opinion if the agreement is implicit? A tacit understanding of ‘the rules of 
the game’ provides a definition of regimes which makes them difficult to 
identify and tricky to pin down what they are really concerned with. 
However, if a specific agreement forms the basis for the regime, its scope 
and agenda is more easily identified. Bernauer’s (1995:352) definition of 
institutions requires that the cooperation is based on ‘explicit, legally or 
politically binding, international agreements’ and does thus not include 
agreements based on informality. The emphasis on explicitness is also 
stressed by Keohane (1989:4), who states that regimes are ‘institutions 
with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular 
sets of issues in international relations’. His definition also limits the 
actors in a regime to governments.  
The Mekong River regime fulfils these criteria, as it is based on an agree-
ment signed by four sovereign states. The agreement spells out the areas 
of cooperation, the institutional framework and general proceedings, the 
details are outlined in chapter 0 below. The agreement forms the basis for 
a regime which main idea is to cooperate on the development of the 
Mekong basin, and creates an organisation, the Mekong River Commis-
sion with its Secretariat, which purpose is to facilitate the realisation of 
this idea. The Mekong thus hosts both an international regime, the 
Mekong River regime based on the Agreement of 1995, and an interna-
tional organisation, the Mekong River Commission. It is important to 
keep these two as separate units for the analysis, for reasons that will be 
explained soon. 
2.2 The Theoretical Model for Analysing Regime 
Effectiveness 
The model as explained by Underdal in chapter one in Miles et al (2002) 
provides the theoretical framework for this report. Underdal suggests that 
there is a chain of events that can be targeted for analysing the effective-
ness of a regime (2002:6). This chain consists of the output, outcome, and 
impact of a regime, where output signifies any form of rules, norms or 
principles that are the result of the regime formation, outcome is the 
change in the target group’s behaviour caused by the output, and impact 
identifies any change in the biophysical environment resulting from the 
outcome (Underdal 2002:5-6). The distinction provides three points of 
attack for evaluating the effectiveness of a regime: does it produce 
anything (output)? Do its members adjust to its recommendations 
(outcome)? And does the regime influence the environment (impact)? 
Kütting (2000:23) claims that an approach which includes effectiveness 
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as a relative concept, defined individually for each regime, only vaguely 
identifies ‘where effectiveness is situated’, for example in the institu-
tional setup, implementation or compliance. In reality, these are often 
intertwined, but for the sake of the analysis it makes sense to distinguish 
between at least two different kinds of effectiveness: institutional effec-
tiveness and environmental effectiveness. The first refers to the output of 
the regime, whether something is produced by the cooperation or not. 
However, ‘[t]his understanding of effectiveness does not require that 
environmental improvement occurs as a result of the agreement’ (Kütting 
2000:4), but rather analyses the success or failure of an institutional struc-
ture independently of whether it approaches the environmental issue that 
inspired it initiation. The second kind of effectiveness incorporates im-
pact on the environment, and seeks to explain ‘an improvement in the 
quality of the natural environment through the actions of the regime’ 
(Cioppa and Bruyninckx 2000). In other words, the environmental effec-
tiveness takes a more holistic approach to the definition of effectiveness 
and incorporates the regimes’ ability to improve the quality of the natural 
environment into the definition of effectiveness (Cioppa and Bruyninckx 
2000). Even though this approach seems sensible when evaluating the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes, it also makes the analysis more 
complicated because it seeks to trace a causal relation between the bio-
physical environment and a regime. The biophysical environment is in-
fluenced by an almost uncountable number of factors, especially big and 
interdependent ecosystems like the Mekong River and its basin. The 
amount of data required to estimate changes in the environment and trace 
their origins is massive, if it is obtainable at all presently. To control for 
all possible sources of influence while attempting to measure that of a 
regime is a huge task, and certainly beyond the scope of this report. It is 
therefore necessary to limit the analysis to the institutional effectiveness 
of the Mekong River regime, and ‘focus on observable political effects 
[…] rather than directly on environmental impact’ (Keohane et al. 
1993:7).  
This report will focus on the output and outcome of the regime, but not 
attempt to measure any impact. Its main emphasis is thus on institutional 
effectiveness, often exemplified by output. Outcome reaches beyond the 
institution and institutional effectiveness because it incorporates change 
in the behaviour of the regime’s target group. This implies that the anal-
ysis will move further than institutional effectiveness. Outcome places 
itself somewhere between institutional and environmental effectiveness, 
but without impact, it does not qualify as environmental effectiveness. 
This report does as stated above not aim to assess the environmental ef-
fectiveness of the Mekong River regime. However, including outcome in 
the analysis enables a distinction between how the qualities of the regime 
as opposed to those of its members affect the regime’s effectiveness. This 
is because the regime’s ability to induce the target group, the member 
states, to alter their policies in the direction of the regime’s policy recom-
mendations and their reaction to this is incorporated into the analysis. 
This is both important and interesting in the Mekong setting, where the 
riparians need to provide energy and resources to give the regime sub-
stance.  
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It is important to notice that Underdal’s model seems to have been ap-
plied mainly to regimes dealing with a specific issue, such as the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, satellite telecommunication, and The Con-
vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (see Miles et al. 
2002). The Mekong River regime is rather different from these: it is 
defined more by a region than by a sector or topic, and it includes several 
policy areas. Its scope is thus wider and its range broader in terms of 
concerns than what is the case with the regimes it has previously been 
applied to. This has implications for the use of the terms and concepts 
which the model rests upon, as they need to be interpreted in a way that 
also fit the Mekong River regime. Output does, for example, not only 
refer to results of the regime formation phase, as Underdal (2002:5) sug-
gests, but also ‘products’ from later stages. Identifying outcome becomes 
particularly difficult – when the regime endorses such a wide range of 
issues, how can a change in behaviour of the actors be recognised? How 
is change in behaviour induced by the regime to be defined, when the re-
gime incorporates so many policy areas, and hence so many areas of 
behaviour? The implications of these differences between the regimes the 
model previously have been applied to and the Mekong River regime are 
important to keep in mind throughout the analysis, and will be returned to 
at the end of chapter five.  
In his model, Underdal (2002:17) further suggests that international 
regimes aiming to coordinate behaviour can be divided into two categor-
ies according to the nature of the problem itself: whether it is a benign 
problem of coordination, or a malign problem of incongruity. This, and 
the problem-solving capacity of the regime and its members, influences 
the effectiveness of the regime. The problem-solving capacity consists of 
three main determinants: the institutional setting, the distribution of 
power among the actors involved in the regime, and the skills and energy 
available (Underdal 2002:23). The influence of other arrangements of 
cooperation in the region has been added as an explanatory category 
within the framework because there are several organisations and agree-
ments with an adjacent or partly overlapping scope as that of the Mekong 
River regime. The dependent variable and the three labels of explanatory 
factors: the benignity/malignity of the problem, the problem-solving 
capacity, and other regional forms of cooperation are further explained 
and operationalised below, but before this, a clarification of why it is 
relevant to incorporate China into the analysis of the effectiveness of the 
Mekong River regime, and the difficulties this raises for the theoretical 
framework, is required. 
2.2.1 Why include China in the analysis of the Mekong River regime 
effectiveness? 
China is not a member of the Mekong River Commission. However, she 
holds observer status in the organisation, and there is an annual formal 
dialogue meeting between China, Burma and the MRC. In April 2002, 
she signed an agreement regarding technical cooperation with the MRC, 
where the Chinese government agreed to provide the downstream coun-
tries with information on water levels on the Mekong River every 24 
hours during the flood season (MRC 2002). Through this agreement and 
her status as observer, she is involved in the organisation and participates 
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in a limited manner. However, China has not signed the Agreement of 
1995, which is the basis for the Mekong River Regime, and has declined 
all offers to become a formal member of the MRC (Borton 16. August 
2002). This creates a special situation which sheds light on why the 
distinction between an organisation and a regime is so significant: China 
is closely related to the Mekong River Commissions organisational web, 
but she is not a part of the Mekong River regime.  
Why is it fruitful to include China in an analysis of the effectiveness of 
the Mekong River regime, if she is not a part of it? The key to this ques-
tion lies in her geographical position as the extreme upstream country of 
the Mekong river. Approximately 16% of the Mekong River’s total dis-
charge into the South China Sea emanates from the Chinese stretches of 
the river (see map section 0). This means that her actions in the upper 
parts of the river influences the options available to the countries further 
downstream (Cheong 1998:221). It has been suggested that one of the 
fundamental requirements for an international regime is its inclusiveness, 
implying the participation of all significant states (Kütting 2000:35; 
Underdal 1980:35). However, it is important to notice that Krasner’s 
regime definition as such does not require inclusiveness, rather, it is the 
effectiveness of a regime that necessitates the inclusion of all significant 
states. The argument is particularly valid for shared natural resources 
such as international rivers or lakes where the affected states are bound to 
be influenced by the others’ treatment of the resource. The condition of 
inclusiveness is not met for the Mekong River regime as long as China 
continues to refuse membership. Her position as the extreme upstream of 
the Mekong River enables her to some extent to determine the fate of the 
river, and suggests that she would have been a strong and powerful parti-
cipant of the regime. The Chinese refusal to join the regime therefore 
provides an interesting viewpoint for evaluating the regime effectiveness: 
how does it influence the regime? Does it affect the strength and effec-
tiveness of the regime? Does her agreement about sharing information 
from 2002 affect the effectiveness of the regime? China’s stand has 
potential to influence the Mekong River regime, and is important to in-
corporate when evaluating its effectiveness. The role of China in relation 
to the regime must be viewed from two angles: it is necessary to consider 
both how China through her actions influences the regime; whether 
China’s behaviour alters that of the regime members and how this en-
hances or hinders the effectiveness of the regime, and to analyse how the 
Mekong River regime influences the behaviour and implementation of 
policies in China; to evaluate the scope of the effectiveness of the regime.  
Underdal (2002:5) distinguishes between the ‘impact of the cooperative 
arrangement itself’ and ‘the costs incurred and the positive side effects’ 
that the regime might generate. He moves on to specify that he will focus 
on the effects of the regime itself, but nevertheless acknowledges that 
‘[t]he aggregate impact of […] side effects may well be more important 
than the impact of any formal convention or declaration signed in the 
end’ (2002:5). This study will incorporate some of the side effects of the 
regime: those related to China. China may be influenced by the regime 
herself, or through the Agreement from 2002, although it is possible to 
claim that this Agreement itself is an effect of the Mekong River regime 
and thus indirectly contributes to the effectiveness of the overall regime.  
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Yunnan Province in China is a neighbour to the MRC countries. Both 
national and provincial governments are represented on cross-border 
issues (Makkonen 2005). It could be possible that the provincial govern-
ment would make some adjustments to the wishes of her neighbours and 
the Mekong River Commission to remain on good terms, because 
freeriders, as Underdal (1980:29) argues, who only enjoy the benefits 
without sharing the costs, often earn a bad reputation amongst their 
prospective partners. The decentralisation process taking place in China, 
which transmits parts of the decision making power to the provincial 
level (Makkonen 2005), might enable the provincial government to do 
this. An adjustment to the policies proposed by the Mekong River regime 
by the provincial government of Yunnan would indirectly contribute to 
the effectiveness of the regime and increase its influence. This possibility 
complicates the analysis of China’s influence on the regime effectiveness, 
and makes it clear that the results could vary with the level of analysis. 
Both central and provincial governmental levels need to be taken into 
account to provide a complete picture.  
The four previous paragraphs have show that China needs to be included 
in a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime, 
incorporating the actions and views of the government at both central and 
provincial level.  
2.2.2 Operationalisation of the dependent variable: regime effectiveness 
The target group of the Mekong River regime is primarily its members, 
and secondarily other riparians. The effectiveness of the regime must 
therefore be measured in terms of the influence it has on these sovereign 
states, their policies and behaviour, as well as in terms of the output of 
the regime.  
The Agreement of 1995 is ambitious and seeks ‘to promote and coordin-
ate sustainable management and development of water and related resour-
ces for the countries' mutual benefit and the people's well-being’ (MRC 
2005e) and covers several sectors, such as ‘irrigation, hydro-power, 
navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and tour-
ism’ (The Agreement 1995:Chapter III, Article 1). The scope of the 
Agreement itself is too wide to provide a basis for evaluating the effec-
tiveness of the Mekong River regime within the framework of this report, 
and it is therefore necessary to focus on one area. All of the mentioned 
sectors could provide the basis for an evaluation, however, some have 
qualities that are more appealing when evaluating the effectiveness of a 
regime than others. This essay will use the hydropower sector as basis for 
evaluating the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime for several rea-
sons. Hydropower is an important sector in resource policies in mainland 
Southeast Asia, and the ‘great demand for energy in combination with the 
great potential in this sector is said to be driving the development [in the 
region]’ (Öjendal and Torell 1997:118). Hydropower is at the centre of 
politics, almost to the extent that ‘as dams assume an emblematic role in 
debates over water resources management, an examination of hydro-
development can shed light on debates over environment and develop-
ment more generally’ (Bakker 1999:228). However, the sector has other 
assets making it suitable for the task. Firstly, hydropower affects both 
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members of the regime and China as they all have plans for developing 
hydropower stations. The choice of sector is not biased towards any actor, 
even though the scale of their planned hydropower plants differs. Second-
ly, consequences and qualities of hydropower development are fairly 
independent of geographical location, even if the plants differ in size. 
This means that all states have the same sort of plans, facing the same 
issues, and must adjust similarly to the same sort of requirements. Other 
sectors vary more between the five states. Irrigation, capacity building or 
fisheries differ in importance and meaning amongst the member states 
depending on geographical location. Thirdly, the Mekong River Com-
mission Hydropower Development Strategy (HDS) was completed in 
2001. This leaves the members only three years to adjust and thereby 
reduces the chances of finding big changes of behaviour. However, the 
strategy was amongst the first ones written after the signing of the 1995 
Agreement, and is thus a document which is a product of the latest phase 
of the regime. Analysing the effectiveness on the basis of this document 
therefore provides an indication of the effectiveness of its most recent 
developments. It is important to note that the de facto period of study 
therefore is from 2001 to 2004, although the operationalisation of the 
dependent variable is meant to provide an indication for the effectiveness 
of the regime from 1995 to 2004. 
As hydropower was one of the original areas of cooperation within the 
Mekong Committee from 1957 onwards, it is possible to compare the 
present Hydropower Strategy with the effectiveness of the Mekong 
Committee within the hydropower sector, and identify changes that have 
taken place. This will be further discussed in the next section.  
One of the most important difficulties with using the hydropower sector 
as indicator is its political sensitivity. The field is regarded as sensitive 
due to the huge investments required, size of the projects and consequen-
ces for the environment and resettlement. It might be more cumbersome 
to obtain trustworthy information on this sector than on some of the 
others, implying both a methodological problem with the reliability of the 
data and a problem with access to the relevant data. This is certainly a 
weakness with using the hydropower sector as indicator for the effective-
ness of the Mekong River regime, however, the advantages presented in 
the previous paragraph seem to outweigh the disadvantages.  
The Hydropower Development Strategy from 2001 contains a number of 
specific policy recommendations for the Mekong River Commission to 
work on, including aspects where the Commission should attempt to 
make its members change their policies. The strategy hence identifies 
areas where the effect of the Mekong River regime in terms of behav-
ioural change by its members can be measured directly. It is also import-
ant to note that the Hydropower Development Strategy relates to other 
sectors, for example through its link to EIAs or the construction of a 
hydraulic model of the Mekong River. It is therefore inevitable that this 
report also will refer to areas adjacent to hydropower.  
14 Ellen Bruzelius Backer 
 
2.2.3 Against which standard is the effectiveness to be measured? 
Underdal (2002:7) suggests that the effect of a regime can be evaluated 
against two points of reference: the baseline, or what the situation would 
have been if the regime had not existed, and the optimum, which is some 
sort of ideal solution. The latter is specified as ‘a collectively optimal 
solution […] that accomplishes, for the group members, all that can be 
accomplished - given the state of knowledge at the time’ (Underdal 
2002:8). Nonetheless, it is claimed that the optimum yardstick is too 
difficult to estimate. It is likely that this is the case for the Mekong River 
regime too, and therefore, neither the optimum point for the regime nor 
how far away from it the regime is, will be defined. This conclusion is 
supported by Bernauer (1995:368), who argues that a collective optimum 
is difficult to define because ‘scientists may disagree about [it] and 
economists may find [it] difficult to determine’. He suggests two other 
standards for evaluating the effectiveness of a regime: compliance and 
the goals of the institution (Bernauer 1995:368), but dismisses the com-
pliance standard on basis of a problem of endogenity, as ‘the evaluative 
standard that is used in the measurement of the dependent variable 
(behaviour is assessed against rules) is also a part of the explanatory con-
cept (institutions include the same rules)’ (Bernauer 1995:359, brackets 
in original). He claims this creates a causal problem related to the effect 
of institutions on outcomes, and for this reason, prefers to use the goals of 
an institution as measurement stick. However, as noted in the section 
describing the operationalisation of the dependent variable, the Mekong 
River regime has a rather wide scope, implying serious measurement 
difficulties. How can sustainability be measured for all the sectors includ-
ed? How could a study of this size include sectors as different as fisher-
ies, capacity building and hydropower? The goals are too loosely defined 
and the sectors too many for a study of this scope. However, Underdal’s 
first point of reference, namely the baseline, is more approachable. Defin-
ing what the state of affairs would have been without the regime and 
hence identifying relative improvement ought to be easier to determine, 
especially since the era of the present Mekong River regime only began 
as recently as 1995, and data describing the period of the regime before 
this are available to a certain extent. This notion will clarify whether the 
regime makes a difference at all. However, the study will not attempt to 
compare the achievements of the regime with a hypothetical state of 
affairs without the regime. This is a counterfactual presumption, and 
there is no certain way of determining what the situation would be with-
out the regime. This kind of comparison is hence not feasible (Kütting 
2000:33-34). Yet to create the yardstick which the effectiveness is to be 
evaluated against, the situation before the regime formation must be 
assessed. The effect of the regime in the period for this study, 2001-2004, 
will be compared to the effect of the regime in previous time periods. The 
measurement stick is thus in some sense external to the dependent vari-
able. The most obvious problem with this solution is that the state of the 
dependent variable, the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime 2001-
2004, is influenced by its past because the history of a regime forms a 
part of the regime at present. However, it is still possible to measure how 
the effect of the regime has changed from a first to a second period, 
which is one of the tasks this study aims to achieve. There are two 
periods that are possible yardsticks: the first phase of the cooperation in 
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the Lower Mekong Basin called the Mekong Committee, lasting from 
1957 to 1978, and the period with the Interim Mekong Committee from 
1978 to 1995. However, due to the historical circumstances in the region, 
the first period of the Mekong Committee is limited to 1969. The 
strengths and weaknesses of both options are discussed in the next 
section.  
Firstly, the Mekong Committee seems rather old to use as a measurement 
stick, as politics, the environment and development in the region has 
changed substantially since the 1950s and 1960s. By comparing the pres-
ent regime with this period, the investigation might find big differences 
that are results of both changes in the world, in the region, and of the 
substantial amount of time that has elapsed. It will hence be difficult to 
control for external effects when evaluating the influence the regime has 
upon its members. This problem is less if using the Interim Mekong 
Committee as yardstick, as it is closer in time to the present regime. 
However, the problem still applies to the early years of this period. 
Secondly, the member states where somewhat different in the early 
Mekong Committee. Vietnam was divided into the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Viet-
nam), and only the latter was a member of the Mekong Committee 
(Öjendal and Torell 1997:53, footnote 25). The unified Vietnam is a 
member of today’s Mekong River regime. During the Interim Mekong 
Committee, however, Cambodia was not a member, at first because of the 
Khmer Rouge government’s absence (Öjendal and Torell 1997:55, foot-
note 28), but after the Vietnamese overthrew the this government in 1979, 
Cambodia did not participate because of unrest and lack of an interna-
tionally recognised government. None of the two possible yardsticks have 
a membership that correspond to the present member states of the 
Mekong River regime, however, the complete lack of one actor during 
the Interim Mekong Committee is of greater concern than the lack of 
North Vietnam during the early Mekong Committee. Thirdly, the unrest 
in Cambodia and in the region in general during the 1970’s imposed 
limits of the workings of the Mekong Committee. Large parts of the basin 
were unavailable because of conflict and instability, thus constraining 
data collection, field visits and implementation of the Mekong Com-
mittee’s programme (Jacobs 1995:142-143). This means that the Interim 
Mekong Committee and the Mekong Committee from 1970 onwards only 
had a limited geographical base to work with. Prior to the 1970s the 
Mekong Committee could gather data and make plans for large parts of 
the lower basin, whilst this was not possible after the 1970s and during 
the interim period. The present Mekong River Commission is able to 
make plans and gather data from the entire lower basin. It thus seems that 
the early Mekong Committee provides a more adequate yardstick than the 
Interim Mekong Committee on this matter, as the former also worked 
with the entire lower basin. Fourthly, the Mekong Committee had poli-
cies on hydropower development, in fact, it as been accused of leaning 
towards projects on developing large scale water resources (Cheong 
1998:224), even if it also had programmes in watershed monitoring and 
rehabilitation and proposals for the improvement of resettlement and 
irrigation schemes (Jacobs 1995:138). This means that an evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime operationalised through its 
hydropower polices is compatible with using the early Mekong Com-
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mittee as its yardstick, as the latter also had policies on this sector. The 
Interim Mekong Committee had similar policies and programmes, though 
they were severely limited due to the regional unrest as described above.  
This discussion has shown that the choice of yardstick is one between 
two candidates which both have their flaws. None offers a perfect basis to 
compare the effectiveness of the present Mekong River regime with. 
However, it seems that the early Mekong Committee from 1957 to 1969 
allows for the best basis for comparison, as the membership is the most 
similar to the present regime and the entire basin was open to the policies 
of the regime, despite its outdatedness. This needs to be taken into ac-
count in the analysis.  
There are, nevertheless, a few issues relating to the early Mekong Com-
mittee that needs to be highlighted when using it as a standard to which 
the effectiveness of the present Mekong River regime is evaluated. First 
of all, the scope of the cooperation was narrower than what is the case 
with the present regime, and as the Mekong Committee had fewer areas 
to focus on, its effect on these might be greater than the effects of the 
present Mekong River regime upon the same sectors since it approaches 
more policy areas. This, however, might also vary with the number of 
staff and resources available. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
the transformation from the Mekong Committee (and Interim Mekong 
Committee) to the Mekong River Commission in 1995 saw some import-
ant changes in the structure of the regime. The Agreement from 1957, 
together with an amendment in 1975 that gave each riparian the right to 
‘a reasonable and equitable’ share of the water, provided the members 
with veto power on each others’ development projects on the mainstream 
and its tributaries (Makim 2002a:10). This principle was rejected in the 
Agreement of 1995 and replaced by a principle of ‘prior consultation’, 
defined as ‘[t]imely notification plus additional data and information’ 
(The Agreement 1995:Article 5, and definitions. Underlining in original). 
The definition specifies that prior consultation is not a right to veto. Addi-
tionally, the Agreement of 1995 differs on the mainstream and the tribu-
taries, and on wet and dry season. It seems clear that the Agreement of 
1995, which is the basis of the regime to be evaluated, differs, and is 
weaker, than the basis of the Mekong Committee (Bakker 1999:223). On 
the other hand, the political authority given to the cooperation in 1995 is 
higher than that of the previous cooperation (Öjendal and Torell 
1997:57). These are significant differences between the regime to be 
evaluated and its measurement stick, to the extent that they have been 
described as ‘a revolutionary change in regime principles, norms, rules 
and decision making procedures’ (Makim 2002a:16). It might even be 
plausible to ask whether it is really the same regime, and should this be 
the case, it would pose serious problems for the applicability of the 
measurement standard of this study. Nonetheless, the regime can also be 
regarded as going through different phases, a development path which 
has been suggested for other regimes (see for example Andresen 2002:; 
Curlier and Andresen 2002). Each phase of the regime differs from the 
previous one, yet the basic characteristics remains the same. Krasner 
(1983:3) states that ‘[c]hanges in rules and decision-making procedures 
are changes within regimes, provided that principles and norms are 
unaltered’. The change in the Mekong River regime is a change in the 
 Paper Tiger Meets White Elephant? 17 
 
rules or decision-making procedures of the regime, and is therefore a 
change within the regime, not in its principles and norms. The principle 
of cooperation on the development of the Mekong River has remained. 
Browder and Ortolano (2000) use this as a starting point for their work on 
the Mekong River regime, and Browder (2000:237) mentions that the 
Mekong River regime has ‘evolved over’ three phases in another work. 
This study will regard the Mekong River regime as one regime that goes 
through different phases.  
An assessment of the effectiveness of the Mekong Committee 
This paragraph will briefly review the achievements and effectiveness of 
the Mekong Committee as accounted for by other scholars, to provide a 
yardstick which the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime may be 
evaluated against. The two main objectives of the Mekong Committee 
were to investigate water resources in the lower Mekong basin and 
identify the most suitable sites for water resources development with an 
emphasis on hydropower development (Bakker 1999:222; Jokinen 
2001:211). It has been accused of only focusing on hydrological, eco-
nomic, and engineering aspects of projects, while neglecting social, 
cultural and environmental issues (Jacobs 1995:138). This is somewhat 
understandable, as for instance an Agricultural Division was only set up 
in 1970 (Jacobs 1995:143), and many of the projects were in fact related 
to hydropower development (Jacobs 1995:140, 142). It is nevertheless 
wrong to claim that it was only a dam-building agency (Jacobs 
1995:138), even if it included less sectors than the present Mekong River 
regime. In fact, it ‘produced millions of dollars’ worth of reports and very 
little else’ (Brady 1993:95), and data ‘collection and coordination 
occupied most of the Committee’s attention and was its most consistent 
contribution in time and effort’2 (Makim 2002b:17). The data gathered 
contained details on the hydrology and geology of the basin, engineering 
studies, and social and economic aspects of water resources (Jacobs 
2002:358). However, there are indications that what was produced was 
not due to the MC itself, as  
[b]y the mid 1960-s, thanks to an extensive international effort 
spearheaded by the United States and ECAFE [Economic Com-
mission of Asia and the Far East], the Mekong Committee had 
completed basic technical investigations, started the construction 
of tributary projects, and initiated planning for mainstream projects 
(Browder 1998:47).  
Three influential investigations, called the ECAFE report (1957), the 
Wheeler report (1958), and the White report (1962), on the basin were all 
financed and led by either UN or US-related bodies or persons (Jacobs 
1995:139, 2002:357). The ECAFE report was commissioned by ECAFE, 
whilst the Wheeler mission was initiated and financed by the US 
Department of the Interior, led by retired Lt Colonel Raymond Wheeler 
from the US Corps of Engineers, and finally the White report, led by 
geographer Gilbert White, was commissioned by the Ford Foundation 
(Jacobs 2002:357; Öjendal 2000:115, 116, 127). Both the ECAFE and the 
Wheeler reports focused on engineering aspects of basin development, 
whilst the White report was more concerned with social and economic 
issues. These aspects were nonetheless neglected in the work of the MC 
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(Öjendal 2000:127). The Mekong Committee was thus only effective to a 
certain extent, mainly in gathering and processing data, and that also this 
was largely driven by foreign experts and funds.  
2.2.4 The explanatory framework 
As mentioned above, Underdal (2002:13) divides the aspects influencing 
the dependent variable, the regime effectiveness, into two main cate-
gories: the problem malignity, and the problem solving capacity. This 
section explains these two categories and how they apply to the Mekong 
River regime, and outlines a third category it is important to take account 
of: participation in other international bodies and agreements in the 
region. The hypotheses are introduced as the framework unfolds. 
The problem malignity 
A problem can be malign in two fields: it may be intellectually difficult, 
in need of intricate models and/or with a lack of accurate and relevant 
data, and it may be a politically difficult problem, as a result of the 
actors’ preferences and interests (Underdal 2002:15). First of all, the 
management of most river basins is an intellectually malign task due to a 
complex ecology (Young 1994:21) and, in the Mekong case, due to lack 
of accurate data on the ecosystem and its components (Öjendal and Torell 
1997:113). This makes it difficult even to know how the management of 
the water will affect the basin and its ecosystem. Knowledge deficits 
make it harder to achieve effective governance (Young 1994:18). These 
two points together lead to 
Hypothesis A: The lack of information and the complexity of the 
ecosystems of the Mekong River Basin limit the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
Secondly, the governance of the Mekong River basin is expected to be a 
politically malign problem. The number of stakeholders makes it more 
difficult to achieve an effective regime, and, as Bernauer (1997:172) 
suggests, the relatively high number of riparians might be an obstacle to 
smooth management. A common situation with transboundary rivers it 
that the quantity and quality of the water each riparian is entitled to is not 
determined (Bernauer 1997:161), creating an unclear foundation for the 
regime. This contributes to the intricacy of accomplishing an agreement 
on the management of the resources, and is thus assumed to limit the 
effectiveness of the regime. Heterogeneity of preferences amongst the 
stakeholders also makes it more difficult to achieve an effective manage-
ment (Bernauer 1997:170-171). The heterogeneity is further enhanced by 
the asymmetrical character of the interests in the Mekong River, with 
many of the actors’ interests being negatively correlated. Underdal 
(2002:19) himself mentions that an upstream-downstream relationship is 
a typical example of this kind of asymmetry. Additionally, the presence 
of externalities might influence the effectiveness of the regime. External-
ities implies that actors, who by agreeing to the regime where they have 
to accept costs they otherwise could have left for others, will be both 
more reluctant to join in the first place, and more sceptical of strict regu-
lations. Upstream countries are often able to externalise costs to those 
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further downstream. The distribution of costs is also fairly easy to predict 
for the actors involved. However, those that suffer from environmental 
damage first, or most severely, might be more eager to have an efficient 
regime and thus take a leading role in the efforts needed for the operation 
of an effective regime (Keohane et al. 1993:17). If a government is very 
concerned with the issues that are or potentially could be addressed by 
the regime, this might lead the government to act as a pusher. Govern-
mental concern can contribute to the effectiveness of a regime (Keohane 
et al. 1993:19). The heterogeneity and the asymmetry of preferences, and 
externalities, all relate to the upstream/downstream division amongst the 
riparians. Downstream countries are generally more vulnerable for up-
stream policies than vice versa, and they are therefore more concerned 
with their rights and protection. This, depending on the capacity of the 
downstream government and the historical patterns of influence, might 
increase the effectiveness of the regime. It may therefore be suggested 
that 
Hypothesis B:  The downstream regime members act as pushers within 
the regime, whilst the upstream members are laggards. 
Pushers are understood as someone who makes efforts to enhance to 
effectiveness of the regime, whilst laggards either make no efforts, or 
consciously work to limit the effectiveness. It is important to note that 
externalities do not necessarily flow from upstream to downstream, as, 
for instance, dams downstream also blocks migratory fish from reaching 
upstream (Bernauer 1997:162). The presence of positive externalities, for 
example, hydropower dams and irrigation reservoirs leading to better 
flood control, is expected to augment the regime effectiveness because it 
induces the regime participants to cooperate to increase the joint benefit.  
The problem solving capacity  
The category ‘problem solving capacity’ relates to three aspects: the 
institutional setting of the regime, the distribution of power amongst the 
actors involved, and the skill and energy available to the cooperation 
(Underdal 2002:23). These will be dealt with in turn below.  
The institutional setting 
The institutional setting influences the effectiveness of the regime both 
through creating an arena where issues can be discussed, and as an actor 
in its own right (Underdal 2002:24). The institutional arena as suggested 
by Underdal seems to be somewhat similar to the contractual environ-
ment that Keohane, Haas and Levy (1993:19) claim is important for 
states to ‘make and keep agreements that incorporate jointly enacted 
rules, without debilitating fear of free-riding or cheating by others’. The 
bodies of the Mekong River Commission are the arena where the states 
interact, and the strength of this arena varies with the decision making 
rules: weak decision making rules limit the chances to promote an 
effective regime. An institution may also contribute to the effectiveness 
of a regime through being an actor in the processes itself, providing 
inputs or amplifying outputs (Underdal 2002:27). It may ‘play an inde-
pendent role in changing states’ interests - and especially in promoting 
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cooperation’ (D'Anieri 1995:154), it may contribute to the agenda 
(Keohane et al. 1993:8), or it may work to increase the states govern-
mental concern (Keohane et al. 1993:21). However, this depends on a 
well functioning organisational body which has the space, capacity and 
skills to be an actor in its own right. A lack of flexibility within the 
regime to adjust to changing, or redefined, issues or problems, may limit 
its effectiveness (Young 1994:150). The availability of resources to the 
institution will also influence the regime effectiveness, where sufficient 
resources are a requirement for an effective regime. However, the source 
of the funding might have an impact on the regime, as external funding 
usually comes with conditions or recommendations. This could have a 
negative impact on the effectiveness of the regime because it may lead to 
a lack of sovereign control over the regime and its policies. Along similar 
lines, Doornbos in Stokke (1995:386) argues that financial aid to 
governments in Third World countries may lead to an ‘erosion of policy-
making capacity’. This is because ‘[d]emands for compliance with con-
tradictory instructions from different donors may result in confusion and 
distortions’ and also leave ‘the governments concerned with limited space 
for autonomous action’. Stokke (1995:28, 66) agrees with this, referring 
to the suggestion that both policy-making and implementation may be 
affected. This report believes the Mekong River Commission to be in a 
similar situation, as the organisation relies on international funding. 
Nonetheless, the donors might also expect achievements and regular 
feedback, which again may enhance the effectiveness of the regime. The 
institutional setting of the Mekong River regime contains aspects with 
both positive and negative influence on its effectiveness that will be 
discussed in detail in the analysis, but all in all, 
Hypothesis C: The institutional setting of the Mekong River regime 
limits the effectiveness of the regime. 
However, an institutional arena that has been active over ‘an extended 
period of time’ probably has the opposite effect, and enhances the 
effectiveness of the regime as the actors expect long-term cooperation 
(Underdal 2002:26). Decades of cooperation in the Mekong Regime has 
made the members committed to this cooperation (Browder 2000:244), 
which implies that 
Hypothesis D:  The many years of cooperation within the Mekong River 
regime increase the effectiveness of the regime. 
The distribution of power 
The distribution of power within the Mekong River regime is partially 
determined by the upstream/downstream division amongst the Mekong 
states, as a strategic position upstream, like Young (1994:128) argues, 
provides considerable power. This particular aspect was discussed under 
the section on problem malignity above. Historical relations and patters 
of influence also significantly influence the distribution of power within 
the regime. Moreover, Underdal (2002:29) claims that ‘the existence of a 
unipolar distribution of power tends to enhance the decision-making 
capacity of the system’, assuming that the powerful actor is a part of the 
regime. China is the extreme upstream of the Mekong River and the actor 
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which most closely fits the label of a unipolar power, but she is not a part 
of the regime. Underdal’s claim can therefore not be valid for this case, 
and the unipolarity of the distribution of power, should this be a correct 
description, will limit the effectiveness of the regime because the unipolar 
power is unable to provide leadership or act as a pusher within the 
regime. In other words, 
Hypothesis E:  The effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is limited 
because the most powerful riparian, China, is not a 
member of the regime.  
However, it is possible that this particular distribution of power may 
induce the regime member countries to cooperate more closely because 
the impacts of China’s development of the river is so significant that the 
other riparians need to coordinate to be able to deal with them. This 
would in case increase the effectiveness of the regime, meaning that: 
Hypothesis F:  The Chinese developments on the upper parts of the 
Mekong River forces the regime members to cooperate 
to deal with the downstream impacts, which increases 
the effectiveness of the regime. 
Skill and energy 
The last aspect of the problem solving capacity, skill and energy, is not 
treated as thoroughly as the other two by Underdal (2002:33). However, 
this aspect is of significance for the evaluation of the Mekong River 
regime, as ‘[d]eveloping countries […] typically lack […] adequate 
capacity on both the governmental and societal dimensions’ (Keohane et 
al. 1993:20). This will, in turn, curb the effectiveness of the regime, as 
states might ‘lack the capacity to implement the provisions of governance 
systems they have agreed to in international negotiations’ (Young 
1994:18-19). Inadequate access to skills is expected to limit the effective-
ness of the regime. Similarly, low levels of energy and will to commit to 
the regime will also affect the regime negatively. Nonetheless, the regime 
will also be affected if the actors have ambiguous or different perceptions 
of the issue (Underdal 2002:33). This is likely to decrease the overall 
effectiveness of the regime, as, if nothing else, the actors will focus on 
different aspects of it. Skills and energy, or the lack of it, might very well 
be a significant factor for the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
This aspect is, however, not given a separate hypothesis, as skill and 
energy will be addressed under hypothesis B and research question 1b).  
Other forms of regional cooperation that might influence the Mekong 
River regime 
Bernauer (1995:361) stresses the importance of controlling for exogenous 
factors when evaluating the effectiveness of a regime. As there are sev-
eral other schemes for cooperation, agreements and Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoU) between the Mekong River riparians, it is im-
portant to assess how these might influence the Mekong River regime. 
This section will provide a brief overview of the most important ones, 
and how they could be expected to influence the Mekong River regime.  
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One of the most extensive schemes is the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
programme (GMS) from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), consisting 
of the Mekong regime members, Yunnan and Guangxi (from 2005) 
provinces in China, and Burma. It ‘aims to promote development through 
closer economic linkages’ (ADB 2005) and focuses on infrastructure and 
free flow of goods and people within the region, but it also has programs 
on transport, energy, telecommunications, environment, human resource 
development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture. It 
is thus a fairly extensive programme and partly overlaps the scope of the 
Mekong River regime. Additionally, there are several bilateral agree-
ments and MoUs between the MRC member states, and between MRC 
member states and China, that address power/electricity policies. This 
affects the incentives these states have to either influence the MRC 
policies on hydropower, or to adhere to the MRC policy suggestions. In 
sum, 
Hypothesis G:  The other forms of cooperation in mainland Southeast 
Asia limit the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
External factors 
There are some general, external factors that always need to be taken into 
consideration when conducting studies in political science, such as eco-
nomic and technological changes, which may reduce or increase incen-
tives for cooperation. Both have played, and probably still do, an import-
ant role in forming the framework which the Mekong River regime has to 
work within. Nonetheless, both factors are so extensive and complex, that 
this study will neither attempt to operationalise them, nor to give an 
indication of how and how much they influence the effectiveness of the 
Mekong River regime.  
2.3 The Hypotheses 
All seven hypotheses are presented here to provide an overview of the 
predicted effectiveness of the Mekong River regime: 
A: The lack of information and the complexity of the ecosystems of the 
Mekong River Basin limit the effectiveness of the Mekong River 
regime. 
B: The downstream regime members act as pushers within the Mekong 
River regime, whilst the upstream members are laggards. 
C: The institutional setting of the Mekong River regime limits the 
effectiveness of the regime. 
D: The many years of cooperation within the Mekong River regime 
increase the effectiveness of the regime. 
E: The effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is limited because the 
most powerful riparian, China, is not a member of the regime.  
F: The Chinese developments on the upper parts of the Mekong River 
forces the regime members to cooperate to deal with the downstream 
impacts, which increases the effectiveness of the regime. 
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G: The other forms of cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia limit the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
Hypothesis B predicts the distribution of roles within the regime, whilst 
all the others make auguries about its effectiveness. Four of them (A, C, 
E and G) spells out limits on the effectiveness, whilst two (D and F) 
suggest factors that might influence the regime effectiveness in a positive 
way. The overall prognosis of the effectiveness is thus rather low.  
Several other aspects of the explanatory framework might have been used 
to phrase the hypotheses, however, these seven aspects have been chosen 
because they together represent all three main categories (problem 
malignity, problem solving capacity, other agreements and treaties). 
There is one hypothesis each on the intellectual and political malignity of 
the regime (A and B respectively), whilst four on the problem solving 
capacity. Two of these relate to the institutional setting, one on the 
institutional setting explicitly, containing several aspects (C), whilst the 
remarkably long history of the Mekong regime warranted a hypothesis on 
its own (D). The other two (E and F) relate to the influence and 
relationship with China, as the relationship between the regime and the 
extreme upstream of the river is both important and interesting. The last 
hypothesis (G) is generated from the third aspect of the explanatory 
framework. It is important to note that the discussion later in the report 
will cover the explanatory framework, whilst paying special attention to 
the hypotheses.  
As for the link between the hypotheses and the research questions, all 
apart from hypothesis B contribute to answering research question 1). 
They all, apart from hypothesis B and the two hypotheses regarding 
China, also provide answers to question 1a). Hypothesis B, however, 
relates to question 1b), whilst the two hypotheses on China link up to the 
research question on China, 1c).  
A model to summarise the explanatory framework, indicating the location 
of the hypotheses is shown on the next page.  
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Figure 1: The explanatory framework 
 
 
 
 
Problem malignity 
♦ Intellectually malign: complex sectors 
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♦ Multiple actors with diverging and 
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upstream/downstream, distribution of 
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Problem solving capacity 
 
Institutional setting: (Hyp C) 
♦ Weak decision-making rules, no monitor 
mechanisms  
♦ Administrative/organisational issues 
♦ Funding 
♦ History of co-operation (Hyp D) 
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♦ Greatest power not member (Hyp E, F) 
♦ Historical pattern 
 
Skill and energy: 
♦ Lack of suitable skills/capacity 
♦ Little energy/will 
♦ Ambiguous perceptions of issue 
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Operationalisation: 
The Hydropower 
Development 
Strategy (2001) 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in the research for this study: 
where and how the data were found, how the various sources of informa-
tion affect the reliability of the data, and how the challenge of obtaining 
information with high validity for this particular study was approached. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. Firstly, the character of the 
study is briefly described, placing it within the greater framework of 
social sciences’ case studies. The second part of the chapter discusses the 
sources used in the study, divided into two main sections. The first one of 
these is concerned with the written sources of the report, their reliability 
and their validity. The other section looks at the material obtained 
through interviews, and what implications the details of the interviews, 
such as who were interviewed, where the interviews were made, and how 
they were conducted, have on the reliability and validity of the data. The 
third and final part of this chapter provides a summary of the methodo-
logical restrictions of the suggestions on this report, presented in bullet 
points. These points are important to keep in mind throughout the rest of 
the report.  
3.1 Case study 
This study is a case study, as it ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, [and] […] the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2003:13). 
Furthermore, information is found in multiple sources of evidence, and 
the study uses established theory to guide the data collection and organise 
the data (Yin 2003:14). Applying a general theory, Underdal’s theory of 
regime effectiveness, to a specific case, the Mekong River regime, im-
plies that the study is a theoretically applied case (Andersen 1997:68). 
However, the study makes an attempt to develop the theory a little fur-
ther, or rather adjust it, through using Underdal’s model for evaluating 
regime effectiveness to analyse a regime with qualities that previously 
have not been included in this kind of studies. These qualities are the 
non-membership in the regime of a significant actor, China, and the scope 
of the regime itself, as it deals not with an issue problem as such, but 
rather with the management of a specific area and resource. The study 
will hence consider the applicability of Underdal’s model to a case be-
longing to a broader kind of regimes.  
3.2 Sources 
When researching a complex case like the Mekong River regime, it is 
important to constantly question the reliability and validity of the data. 
The reliability is the trustworthiness of the information: is it true? Is this 
really the case?, whilst the validity of the data says something about its 
applicability to this particular study. There are difficulties related both to 
the reliability and the validity of the data gathered for this study, for in-
stance, quite a number of the sources used for this study mention the lack 
of credible statistical data on basic matters such as river basin resources, 
water flow, fish population and its behaviour. This restrains the accuracy 
of the foundation on which policies are suggested and implemented, im-
26 Ellen Bruzelius Backer 
 
plying that the consequences of the policies could be partly unknown 
because their effects in all areas are not taken into account. This reduces 
both the reliability of the material, through inaccurate observations, and 
its validity, as certain aspects of the Mekong River basin might be influ-
enced by policies that they are neither incorporated into nor an explicit 
part of. To improve and to some extent test the reliability and validity of 
the data, it has been approached from several sources, triangulating the 
data. Confirming and reconfirming information is particularly important 
when studying a sensitive issue like hydropower policies. Information 
about controversial projects like hydropower dams is often limited to 
official material, and it may be difficult to obtain material from other 
sources about such projects in China (Heggelund 2002:10), as well as in 
the Mekong River regime member states. It is important to notice, how-
ever, that although the study gathered information about the same topic 
from different sources, it also needed to conduct research on different as-
pects of the overall topic. The process of data gathering has hence both 
attempted to confirm the same data from as many relevant sources as 
possible, and to collect information about related yet separate topics. For 
example, the Vietnamese contribution to the effectiveness of the Mekong 
River regime, and the Thai contribution to the effectiveness of the 
Mekong River regime, are two aspects of the same overall topic, the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime, but data relating to the Thai 
contribution does not in any way increase the reliability of the data 
relating to the Vietnamese contribution. Together, however, they are a 
part of the overall picture of the effectiveness of the Mekong River re-
gime itself. These two processes of data gathering must not be confused. 
The following sections outline the strengths and weaknesses, particularly 
those related to validity and reliability, of the sources of evidence used 
for this report. 
3.2.1 Written sources 
Several kinds of written sources have been used for this report: official 
documents from MRC, documents written by NGOs, donors, and schol-
ars, and information obtained through media. The MRC Hydropower 
Development Strategy from 2001 and the Agreement on the Cooperation 
for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin from 1995 
are important primary sources of information which the report rest upon. 
Several of the questions posed to get an impression of the effectiveness of 
the Mekong River regime as it is perceived and understood by the inter-
viewees are drawn from the particular policy suggestions in the Hydro-
power Development Strategy. These policy suggestions provided a mea-
surement stick for how well the MRC policies are implemented and 
embedded in the policies of the respective member countries, and allowed 
for a number of rather precise questions regarding policy change and 
adaptation in the MRC member countries as intended by the MRC 
Hydropower Development Strategy. Official documents, like this strategy 
and the 1995 Agreement, are both unobtrusive and exact, and, as Dahl 
(1967:77) suggests, created under controlled circumstances, which could 
enhance their reliability. However, they might also be written with a bias 
or a specific purpose (Yin 2003:87), or created under pressure to follow 
conventions to hide or ignore difficulties and disagreements (Dahl 
1967:77). The last point could possibly apply to the Agreement of 1995, 
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which was written under pressure by the UN and donors to prevent the 
historical Mekong co-operation from falling apart. It is also noteworthy 
that the Hydropower Development Strategy was written by four foreign 
consultants, reviewed by a panel of local and foreign advisors. Both the 
Agreement of 1995 and the HDS are available from the Mekong River 
Commission website, however, the agreement on exchange of informa-
tion between the Mekong River Commission and China from 2002 is not. 
I have not been able to get hold of a copy despite several requests to the 
MRC staff and to other contacts, and none seems to be available online.  
Particularly data gathered from NGO- and donor-produced material could 
be problematic in terms of reliability, as they might be written with a 
more or less specific political agenda in mind, attempting to sway other 
actors. These kinds of documents are thus in danger of twisting the facts 
for the benefit of their agenda (Dahl 1967:73), influencing the manner in 
which information is presented as well as what information is put for-
ward, and reducing the reliability of the information provided. Addition-
ally, such documents often argue how matters ought to be, or what is 
problematic with the present situation, instead of stating how things are in 
a more balanced manner. This makes it more difficult and time consum-
ing to find data that are valid for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
Mekong River regime in these documents. However, some of the material 
written by donor agencies, particularly SIDA, has provided important 
information for this report, as it presents a more complete image of the 
policies in the basin, or a more focused evaluation of the Mekong River 
Commission, than what other sources have done.  
Academic material with high validity is available on a limited basis. 
There are a number of studies on the transition from the Mekong Com-
mittee, to the Interim Mekong Committee and furthermore to the Mekong 
River Commission, however, the effectiveness of the cooperation is only 
commented in smaller sections. It is also noteworthy that some of the 
academic material this paper is based on is working papers and unpub-
lished work, hence reducing the reliability of the material. The lack of 
sources of information with high validity has made it necessary to rely on 
these kinds of sources, even if it reduces the trustworthiness of the sug-
gestions made by this report.  
Some of the written material on which this study is based, is classified as 
‘restricted’, and has not been available through public channels. These 
documents have mostly been bought in a peculiar little bookstore in 
Vientiane that sold public as well as restricted copies of government and 
donor reports. In my opinion, this is an indication of the secrecy and 
sensitivity that characterises the politics of the Mekong region and of the 
difficulties of obtaining primary sources. 
3.2.2 Interviews 
The data in this report are partially drawn from a number of interviews 
conducted in China and the Mekong River Basin in January-February 
2006. The journey was financed by grants from the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Oslo, The Norwegian State Educa-
tional Loan Fund, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute and UNIFOR. This did 
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not seem to sway the interviewees. There are a number of methodological 
difficulties raised by the process of gathering data for this report through 
interviews, addressed under the appropriate headings below. 
Who? 
When analysing policies in five different states, it is difficult to get an 
overview of who knows what, and who it is appropriate to talk to in order 
to gain access to relevant information. The character of the topic made it 
necessary to try to interview representatives from both the governmental 
sector, the civil sector, donors and locally based academics in all MRC 
member countries, Beijing and Yunnan. A variety of perspectives from 
people from different segments of society increases the reliability of the 
data (Rubin and Rubin 2005:67). Nonetheless, mapping who within these 
sectors in the different states would be most appropriate to talk to is a 
daunting task, requiring more time than what the scope of this study 
allowed. The attempt to find, get in touch, and organise a meeting with all 
these people was bound to be less than 100% successful. The selection of 
sources of information was therefore to some extent characterised by 
chance, because it is partially luck to discover who has the most appro-
priate knowledge. Lists of participants from various international confer-
ences and meetings, discovered on the internet, proved to be of great help 
when mapping out who has the appropriate competence and finding their 
contact details. However, not all relevant people once identified and 
approached, were willing to talk to a master student or a researcher, as I 
sometimes introduced myself as. Time is precious and many of the rele-
vant people are busy, hence, the selection of available people was smaller 
that what a perfectly planned fieldwork would allow for. Even though the 
selection was done paying as much respect to representativity and rele-
vance as possible, their acceptance of the invitation to talk about Mekong 
issues is beyond my control. This reduces the chances of gaining access 
to the appropriate persons, possibly decreasing the reliability of the data 
as well as the chances of obtaining data with a high validity.  
Nonetheless, there are two aspects that helped prevent the negative ef-
fects of the size of the populations which the interviewees have to be 
drawn from, and the difficulties of having access to the appropriate per-
sons. Firstly, I have quite a few contacts in the environmental govern-
ment and civil sector in the MRC member countries from my internship 
at the Thailand Environment Institute in Bangkok, where I amongst other 
tasks organised the Second Regional Environmental Forum for Mainland 
Southeast Asia. This was important as it gave me a clue of where to start 
when contacting people, and meant that I had met and communicated 
with quite a few relevant interviewees. When planning who to interview, 
I often started by looking at my contacts in the relevant sector and coun-
try, and emailed these persons with information about my research. I 
asked whether they would be able to talk to me about these issues, and if 
they were not, whether they could suggest someone else that would be. In 
many cases, my own contacts agreed to meet me. In this manner, my 
network enabled me to meet more relevant people that what I probably 
could have done otherwise, and allowed for some sort of control of 
whether they were able to provide information with high validity. 
Secondly, one of my supervisors for the thesis on which this report is 
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based has worked with Chinese environmental issues for twenty years, 
hence, I was able to receive suggestions from her and her contacts on 
who to interview in China. I also contacted a Swedish academic, Joakim 
Öjendal, who has written a Ph. D. on the Mekong River (Öjendal 2000), 
presented my topic and asked for his suggestions on who to interview. 
These suggestions were given high priority when choosing who to ap-
proach with a request for a meeting. I believe that these two factors 
together made me able to get in touch with persons that could provide 
more valid and reliable information, and know better who would be able 
and willing to provide this information, than what otherwise might have 
been the case. This is not to say, however, that there are other people that 
could have made significant contributions to the study, had they and I 
been given the chance, but given the scope and prerequisites of this 
report, I believe the selection of interviewees was done in a controlled 
manner as possible.  
Where?  
Given the topic of this study, it would have been appropriate to visit and 
make interviews in all the MRC member states. Nonetheless, this was 
unfeasible due to restrictions on time and financial resources. Interviews 
were done in Beijing, to get the official Chinese view on Mekong mat-
ters, and in Kunming in the Yunnan province, to have views from the 
regional Chinese level. Furthermore, interviews were conducted in the 
Lao capital of Vientiane, where the Mekong River Commission head-
quarter is situated, which enabled me to talk to both international NGOs 
in Lao PDR, independent researchers, and to the Lao National Mekong 
River Committee Secretariat, in addition to staff of the Mekong River 
Commission Secretariat. It should be noted that the civil sector in Lao 
PDR is both small and restricted, hence it is more difficult to obtain reli-
able information from alternative sources there than in some of the other 
MRC members. The last interviews took place in Bangkok, Thailand, 
where I met with locally based academics, international NGOs, the ADB, 
donor representatives and the Thai National Mekong River Committee 
Secretariat. It is a weakness of this report that representatives from Viet-
nam and Cambodia were not interviewed, however, the scope of the study 
necessitates such shortcuts, even though the price is paid in reduced 
reliability. Nonetheless, there are certain points that make it appropriate 
to chose Thailand and Lao PDR, if only two of the MRC members may 
be visited. Firstly, the two represent two different forms of government, 
democracy and socialist republic respectively. It is important that both 
these are included to have a chance of indicating whether system of gov-
ernment influences the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime upon 
its members. Secondly, Thailand and Lao PDR are very different when it 
comes to economic strength, and hence, they will provide an indication of 
how much this matter in relation to the effectiveness of the Mekong River 
regime. Thirdly, their positions along the Mekong River make them 
important to visit. Thailand, as the most upstream of the MRC states, has 
the least incentives to adhere to the Mekong River regime. If she adjusts 
to these policies, it will indicate that the regime is effective to some 
extent. Lao, on the other side, is the country with the highest potential for 
hydropower development of the members. Many of the planned hydro-
power dams are situated in Lao PDR. Her compliance with the regime is 
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thus significant in order to have an indication of the scope of the effec-
tiveness of the regime, to how general its influence is. It thus seems as 
even if it would have been best to make interviews in all four MRC mem-
ber states, it is possible to make some suggestions regarding the effective-
ness of the Mekong River regime based on information gathered from 
interviews with Lao and Thai representatives only. Though it is a flaw of 
the study, it is a justifiable one. 
How? 
The interviews were conducted in English, sometimes helped by French 
vocabulary. It would obviously have been better to conduct the interviews 
in Mandarin, Lao, and Thai, however, this was not possible. Not conduct-
ing the interviews in the interviewees’ native language is likely to have 
reduced the reliability of the data obtained. Nonetheless, as the Mekong 
River Commission is an international organisation, with English as its 
working language, those that work with the organisation are used to 
express themselves in English when discussing MRC matters. This re-
duces the negative effect of not using the interviewees’ native language. 
Additionally, I have studied in China, and held an internship in Thailand, 
so I have some relevant cultural competence for the areas visited. This 
enabled me to decode the interview situation and behave in an appropri-
ate manner in order to get as much information as possible.  
Upon request, the interviewees received information about the topic of 
the study and summary of the subjects that were to be discussed during 
the interview. This was both problematic and beneficial, problematic be-
cause they were able to prepare the answers in advance, and hence only 
state what is ‘politically correct’, but beneficial because this also gave 
them time to consider the questions, find appropriate answers and neces-
sary information. If the interviews did not want information about the 
project prior to the interview, I started the meeting by providing a brief 
outline of the purpose of the study and its variables, to ensure that the 
interviewees understood the purpose of my questions. This was particu-
larly important when approaching sensitive issues, as it allowed me to 
hint at topics without necessarily asking direct questions, and the inter-
viewees to answer in an equally subtle manner. This is obviously prob-
lematic for the reliability of the information obtained, however, the 
sensitive nature of the study as well as cultural norms necessitated this 
approach.  
The interviews were based on an interview guide, composed of similar 
yet differing questions depending on who was to be interviewed. It is 
therefore possible to compare the different interviewees’ answers. I had a 
flexible approach to my interview guides which, according to Thagaard 
(2002:85), ensures that the questions are relevant for the interviewee’s 
position. I tried to achieve this without compromising on the core issues. 
The questions were designed to cover certain aspects of the effectiveness 
of the Mekong River regime, based on my impression from the written 
material I had studied prior to the fieldwork. My aim was ‘not to restrict 
or predetermine the responses but at the same time cover the research 
concerns’ (Rubin and Rubin 2005:135). The questions were open, letting 
the interviewee talk about what issues felt appropriate, but with enough 
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structure to guide the conversation in order to obtain relevant and valid 
information. When I had conducted a fair number of interviews, I started 
to ask the interviewees to comment on information obtained in previous 
interviews. This enabled me to control the reliability of the information, 
but it also meant that the structure of the interviews changed somewhat as 
I went along. As for the most sensitive issues, I tried to approach them as 
carefully and gently as I could, often introducing them in an indirect 
fashion, which, as Rubin and Rubin argues (2005:119), gives the inter-
viewees the option to discuss them or not. The cultural norms in Asia 
required me to ensure that nobody would ‘lose face’ if they were unwill-
ing or uncomfortable discussing a topic, this approach is hence appropri-
ate. If the interviewees provided an answer to the touchy theme, I pro-
ceeded with more direct questions on the matter. If not, I let it drop, and 
made another attempt at a later stage in the interview if it felt suitable. I 
took notes during the interviews, and then transcribed the notes to 
interview summaries within 12 hours of the interview. Recording the con-
versations would have made the data more reliable, however, the sensi-
tivity of the issue made this difficult if I had any aspiration of getting 
more information than the ‘official version’. The interviewees were 
allowed to remain anonymous for the same reason. This represents a 
dilemma: anonymous sources reduce the reliability of the data, but ethi-
cally sound research must protect the identity of the interviewees when 
the information they provided might be used against them (Thagaard 
2002:24). The sensitive character of the topic made me accept this as a 
necessary precaution to protect the persons I met and talked with. It was a 
choice I made to obtain information as accurate as possible on the situa-
tion in the Mekong River basin, even if it does make my results less 
trustworthy. To ensure that the study can be replicated, however, I have 
given each interviewee a random number, and the statements may be 
compared to my notes that have been made anonymous. The names and 
positions of the interviewees are listed in alphabetical orders at the end of 
the report. The numbers do not correspond with the list. It is important to 
notice, however, that anonymous sources are rather the rule than the 
exception in research on the Mekong River basin politics. 
3.3 Methodological restrictions 
The main restrictions on the suggestions in this report as a result of the 
methodology applied and the sources used, are 
• Lack of representativity of the interviewees means that the results 
might be less reliable for Vietnam and Cambodia than for Thailand 
and Lao PDR. 
• Scarcity of academic material with high validity made it difficult to 
confirm all information, reducing the general reliability of the sug-
gestions. 
• A certain degree of unrepresentativeness in the selection of inter-
viewees implies reduced reliability of the data.  
• Previous experience in the region, valuable contacts and suggestions 
from interviewees of whom it would be appropriate to meet with, 
ensured that I have been in touch with quite a few of those that are 
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considered to posses knowledge and competence relevant to the 
study. 
• Experiences and cultural competence of the region made sure I was 
able to approach and talk to the interviewees in an appropriate 
manner, obtaining as much information as possible in a culturally 
sensitive manner. This proved to be particularly important regarding 
the sensitive issues. 
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4 Empirical background and findings 
This chapter sets forth the empirical background of the Mekong River 
regime and the findings from the fieldwork and interviews. It starts by 
presenting the Mekong River and its geographical and hydraulic qualities, 
supplemented by a map indicating the basin area, to provide a foundation 
for the following parts of the chapter. The first concentrates on the 
Mekong River Commission itself; the history of the cooperation, the 1995 
Agreement, which is the backbone of the present phase of the regime, and 
the organisational structure and funding. Then, the implementation or 
follow-up of the Hydropower Development Strategy is described, before 
some of the perceptions about the regime and its organisation that were 
gathered during the fieldwork are outlined. These sections relate to the 
regime itself. The next parts of the chapter present the empirical 
background and findings on the riparians: Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, 
Vietnam and China. Each state has one section that is divided into the 
following sub-sections: political background, geography, political rela-
tions to the region, relationship to the MRC, and perceptions of the MRC. 
Together, this forms the background on which the analysis in the next 
chapter rests. 
4.1 The Mekong River 
The Mekong River runs for about 4,400 km through the South East Asian 
mainland, which makes it the 12th longest river in the world (see map 
following page). The basin covers 795,000 km2, and is inhabited by 
approximately 70 million people of various culture, ethnicity and lan-
guage. There are six riparian countries, and they differ from other post-
colonial states in that they were ‘established political entities’ before the 
European colonisation of present Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and 
Burma (Dosch and Hensengerth 2005:265). Thailand and China were 
never formally colonised. The source of the Mekong River, only deter-
mined with certainty in 1994 (Osborne 2000:12), is located in the Tibetan 
mountain plateau 4,975 meters above sea level (Makim 2002b:7, footnote 
8), but the river falls rapidly through steep valleys and gorges on its way 
through China. At the time it leaves the upper Mekong Region, the river 
is only about 500 meters above sea level (Browder 1998:35), and turns 
into a wide, docile-looking body of water, occasionally interrupted by 
rapids and falls. As it enters Vietnam, it spreads out into a delta with 
numerous waterways leading to the South China Sea. Within the basin, 
snow where rainwater may be stored is only found in the Tibetan moun-
tains, and the river therefore experiences significant contrast between the 
wet and the dry season (Browder and Ortolano 2000:501). The wet 
season from May to November with floods peaking in September-
November may account for 85-90% of the total flow of the river (Dore 
2003:423). This causes the river level to change up to 14 m in some 
locations (Yu 2003:1223). During this wet season, the massive amount of 
water in the Mekong River mainstream forces the Tonle Sap River, which 
normally empties the Tonle Sap into the Mekong River at a river junction 
by Phnom Penh, to reverse its direction and fill the lake with water from 
the Mekong River. The coverage of the lake then expands from approxi-
mately 2,000 km2 at its lowest to 10,000 km2 or more during the wet 
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season (Browder 1998:36), and the depth increasing from about one 
meter to ten meters (Osborne 2004:4). This seasonal phenomenon is one 
of the qualities that makes the Mekong River basin unique, and allows for 
ecosystems that have adapted to this special pattern. However, data 
describing the environment and ecosystem in the region is generally 
inadequate or even nonexistent (Lebel, Garden, and Imamura 2005:; 
Öjendal and Torell 1997:25, 113), and the capacity of the state agencies 
in the region to collect information is modest (Lebel et al. 2005). The 
river is navigable from the sea only up to the northern parts of Cambodia, 
as the Khone Falls on the Lao-Cambodian border and a sequence of 
rapids in the northern parts of Cambodia prevent all ships from sailing 
further up the river. There is no development of significance on the 
mainstream and the basin is relatively untouched apart from the present 
hydropower development in China. This is mirrored by the human re-
sources situation, as persons from the region with suitable education or 
training on river management are scarce (Bakker 1999:218; Öjendal and 
Torell 1997:149). The poverty rates in the region are high, more than 
35% of the population in Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR, and 16% in 
the Thai area of the basin (Osborne 2004:3). The Mekong basin is marked 
by ethnic and cultural diversity with more than 100 ethnic groups living 
within the boundaries of the basin (Cogels 2005). The six riparian states 
have differing languages and script and cannot communicate in their 
native languages3, and there are a number of minority languages and 
tribes in addition to the riparian nationalities. A large majority of the 
basin inhabitants, about 85%, ‘make their living directly from the natural 
resources base’ of the basin (Jacobs 2002:356). The total hydropower 
potential of the river is estimated to be 285TW (terawatt) (Yu 
2003:1223). 
4.2 The Mekong River Commission 
4.2.1 History 
The lower Mekong River riparians have cooperated for decades. The 
Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong 
Basin, known as the Mekong Committee, was initiated by the UN in 1957, 
with the twofold purpose of supporting non-communist countries and 
promoting economic development in the region (Öjendal 2000:110), 
although neither Burma nor China were included in the planning efforts. 
Burma was not interested, whilst China was not a member of the UN at 
the time and therefore excluded (Jacobs 1995:139). The founding mem-
bers of the Mekong River cooperation are thus Thailand, Lao, Cambodia 
and South Vietnam. Three important studies were conducted under the 
umbrella of the Mekong Committee: an ECAFE study, The Wheeler 
Report and The White Report (Jacobs 1995:139). They aimed at mapping 
the potential primarily for hydropower development in the region and 
improve the natural resources and economic database. However, war and 
unrest prevented any large-scale plans from being realised as the US 
military involvement in the region escalated from the mid 1960s. The 
communist takeover of power in Lao PDR, Cambodia and a united Viet-
nam in the mid 1970s changed important preconditions for the Mekong 
cooperation, however, Vietnam, Lao PDR and Thailand continued to 
cooperate in an Interim Mekong Committee. The Cambodian govern-
ment,  headed  by  Pol Pot  from the genocidal Khmer Rouge, was absent  
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Map 2: The Mekong River Basin 
Map from the MRC/Nhan Quang 
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and did not respond to invitations from the others. This absence also 
implied a continued halt to the regional development plans, a situation 
which pertained throughout the 1980s. With the readmittance of 
Cambodia to the international society in the early 1990s, the cooperation 
in the lower Mekong River basin was reinvigorated, and after difficult 
negotiations, the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin was signed by all four govern-
ments in 1995. This agreement spelled out new organisational arrange-
ments and goals for the cooperation, explained below. 
4.2.2 The 1995 Agreement  
The Mekong River regime is based on the Agreement on the Cooperation 
for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, signed by 
the four participatory sovereign states: Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam, on April 5th 1995 in Chang Rai, Thailand. The Agreement 
spells out the areas of cooperation (Article 1), the institutional framework 
(Chapter IV), the budget and sources of funding (Article 14), how to deal 
with differences and disputes (Chapter V) and other proceedings (The 
Agreement 1995), and provides the basis for the cooperation referred to 
as the Mekong River regime. It is an overarching structure that addresses 
river and water issues in a basin perspective (interview 3.1, interview 3.2, 
MRC 2005a), but emphasises respect for the sovereignty of the signatory 
states, and is not granted enforcement power (interview 3.1, interview 
3.5, interview 3.6, interview 4.1, interview 4.5, The Agreement 
1995:Article 4). The signatories aim to ‘cooperate on the basis of sov-
ereign equality and territorial integrity in the utilization and protection of 
the water resources of the Mekong River Basin’ (The Agreement 
1995:Article 4). Implementation of policy recommendations rests with 
the member states (interview 3.1, interview 3.4), and the organisation 
‘has no mandate to act on its own in any fashion that has not been 
approved by the member countries’ (Osborne 2004:9). As mentioned 
previously, the regime has a wide scope and aims to cooperate in areas 
such as navigation, hydropower, fisheries, irrigation timber floating and 
fisheries. The MRC holds the status of an international body and may 
enter into agreements and obligations with the international community 
and donors (The Agreement 1995:Article 11). 
The decision making rules for the parties’ use or diversion of the water 
from the Mekong River depend on both season and location of the 
development on mainstream/tributaries as stated in the Agreement of 
1995. The strictest restrictions relate to inter-basin diversion during the 
dry season, which is only allowed if agreed upon by the Joint Committee 
through a specific agreement for each project (The Agreement 
1995:Article 5, B 2 b). Other projects for use of the water require either 
prior notification or prior consultation, but the parties have no right to 
veto any development project (The Agreement 1995:Chapter II, ‘Prior 
consultation’). 
4.2.3 The organisation 
The Agreement of 1995 describes the structure of an international body 
with three permanent sections: a council, a joint committee, and a secre-
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tariat (The Agreement 1995:Article 12). The Mekong River Commission 
(MRC) is the term used to describe the whole body with all three sec-
tions, while the Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRCS) denotes 
the permanent secretariat. The secretariat’s office is located in Vientiane, 
Lao PDR, it moved from Phnom Penh in 20044. The Secretariat is staffed 
with riparian citizens in equal number (The Agreement 1995:Article 33) 
and foreign experts, whilst the CEO and program coordinator posts are to 
be held by ‘foreigners’ (interview 3.5). The cooperation is organised into 
four Core Programmes, one Support Programme, and five Sector Pro-
grammes (MRC November 2003), and the ‘organisation itself has under-
taken a radical restructuring to lay the basis for a modern river basin 
management body’ (MRC 2005b). Each programme has its own contact 
network and sources of data, and there is little communication between 
them (interview 3.5). 
The MRC appointed a new CEO in summer 2004 who brought noticeable 
changes to the profile of the organisation, shifting emphasis from know-
ledge and capacity building to development and investment facilitation 
(interview 3.4, interview 3.5, interview 3.6, interview 4.1, interview 4.2, 
interview 4.4). 
The MRC relates to the member states’ governments through National 
Mekong Committees (NMC), who coordinate MRC programmes at the 
national levels, and provide a link between the national ministries and 
line agencies (MRC 2005a). The setup of the NMCs is not uniform, but 
varies between the member states (interview 3.4, interview 4.4).  
The MRC relates to other organisations through partnerships on specific 
projects, research or MoUs. Some, such as the ADB, ASEAN, the World 
Bank, IUCN and WWF, have been granted observer status, which gives 
them right to participate in all formal MRC meetings (MRC 2005d). The 
MRC and the ADB also has concrete technical cooperation, and the ADB 
funds the Flood Management and Mitigation Programme (interview 3.5).  
Funding 
The Mekong River regime has historically been financed by the UN and 
the international community, but, as Jacobs (1995:142) suggests, Thai-
land also contributed substantially to the early phase of the regime. The 
Mekong cooperation had received almost US$ 50 millions (1992 dollars) 
from the UNDP by 1992 (Browder 2000:248), which makes it the 
UNDP’s ‘single largest program commitment’ (Makim 2002b:31, foot-
note 73). Currently, the signatory states provide a little more than 45% of 
the operating expense budget, that is, the budget of the Secretariat itself, 
without the costs of the programmes (MRC 2004:77). The donors’ grants 
were a little less than US$ 13 millions in 2004, whilst the riparians’ 
contribution was slightly more than US$ 1 million (MRC 2005c:42). As 
for new funding agreements concluded in 2004, the Netherlands stand out 
with a donation slightly above US$ 14 millions, whilst Sweden has 
granted US$ 4,7 millions, Germany US$ 3,5 millions, Finland US$ 2,3 
millions, and Denmark has pledged US$ 11,2 millions (MRC 2005c:41). 
The donors provide funding to the MRC on a program basis and support 
the programs of their choice (interview 4.4). 
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4.2.4 Follow-up of the Hydropower Development Strategy (HDS)  
The development of Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-Basin Diver-
sions, as specified by Article 26 in the 1995 Agreement and briefly 
referred to in the HDS (MRC 2001a:64) are on schedule and will prob-
ably be ready in 2006, with three of five procedures already approved by 
the Joint Committee (interview 3.3, interview 3.6, MRC 2001b, 2003a, 
2003b). The member countries have not defined the exact dates of the wet 
and dry season within the context of the flow regulations (interview 4.1), 
as the Procedures for notification, prior consultation and agreement state 
that the ‘MRC JC [Joint Council] will decide on the actual dates of the 
start and the end of the wet and dry seasons’ (MRC 2003a:section 1). A 
precise definition of ‘tributary’ is also left for later: ‘[f]or the purposes of 
the present Procedures, a tributary as decided by the JC is a natural 
stream of the Mekong River System whose flows have a significant im-
pact on the mainstream. This definition is subject to be reviewed and 
agreed upon after some time of implementation is any concern is raised’ 
(MRC 2003a:section 1). What is to be counted as significant, is, however, 
not specified. The upstream countries wants a more limited definition 
than the downstream ones (interview 4.1). 
The hydraulic model of the Mekong River is very close to completion 
(interview 3.3, interview 3.6). The Chinese parts of the river are not in-
cluded in the model (interview 3.3, interview 3.6, Halcrow Group Ltd 
2004:i), although the model has made assumptions on the operations of 
the Chinese dams for its impact assessments (interview 3.6). At the 
Annual Dialogue meeting with China and Burma in 2004, the Chinese 
statement had not mentioned the building of seven new dams that were 
publicly announced the following week (interview 4.2). The model is 
organised so that each member state has one copy and may conduct 
analyses in private, before sharing the results with the other member 
states (Halcrow Group Ltd 2004:6).  
The transboundary guidelines for EIAs are currently being formulated 
(interview 3.1, MRC 2005f). The information base on the Mekong River 
is also almost complete, though the MRC member countries refuse to 
make it public for security reasons (interview 3.5). The MRC has estab-
lished transboundary working groups to control the water quality on the 
Mekong River (interview 4.5), and the Appropriate Hydrological Net-
work Project has conducted national training programmes. Data centres 
have been commissioned and are ready for local staff to move in (MRC 
2005c:22). 
4.2.5 General perceptions of the MRC and the Mekong River regime 
It has been suggested that many state actors of the riparian members 
states prefer the MRC to be a rather toothless organisation that identifies 
development projects and attracts external funds, whilst the control of the 
development remains with the states themselves (Dore 2003:425). The 
agreement has been described as weak, allowing the members to interpret 
it as they please (interview 4.4) or simply sideline it (Lebel et al. 2005). 
The organisation has focused on gathering data and building capacity 
because these areas are less sensitive (interview 3.2), but it also aims to 
 Paper Tiger Meets White Elephant? 39 
 
build trust between the member states. The region is marked by ‘genuine, 
recent, bad blood’ (interview 4.2). It was claimed that the regime relies 
on a unique ‘Mekong Spirit’ that has been created after decades of 
cooperation (interview 3.3, Öjendal 2000:113) and a special wish to 
cooperate (interview 4.5). The new CEO has, as mentioned, shifted the 
focus of the organisation, a move which showed to be somewhat 
controversial and was perceived or described negatively by several 
interviewees ( interview 3.4, interview 3.5, interview 4.1, interview 4.4, 
interview 4.5). 
The limited definition of tributary the MRC currently uses implies that 
the MRC has made itself irrelevant to much of the development work 
financed through other channels such as the ADB or Chinese private 
sector (interview 4.2). It also gives the member countries incentives to 
develop tributaries because they are excluded from the Agreement of 
1995, and hence no notification of other MRC members is required 
(interview 3.3, interview 4.2). It has been suggested that this definition, 
separating tributaries and the mainstream, is made for the sake of 
convenience to accommodate these kinds of policies (Lebel et al. 2005). 
The MRC cooperation is focusing on water-sharing, not on sharing of 
benefit, although this has been suggested by the donors (interview 4.4) 
and by Thailand (interview 4.1). It was also suggested that the effective-
ness of the regime varies not with the member countries, but rather with 
the different sectors and programmes. This is because capacity varies 
within the member countries, where some sectors are better equipped to 
deal with transboundary issues than others (interview 3.1). 
The MRC Hydropower Development Strategy was described as an out-
dated document that had not had any influence on hydropower policies in 
the region at all (interview 4.2), and the hydropower programme of the 
ADB was considered more vibrant than the HDS (interview 4.1). It was 
also suggested that it the HDS is not moving forward smoothly, primarily 
because some of the member states have the resources to fund their own 
projects. This means that they do not need to adhere to the MRC recom-
mendations (interview 3.3). Some of the National Mekong Committees 
have also expressed concern that the HDS has not materialised into 
concrete projects (MRC 2004:56).  
It was also mentioned that ADB’s GMS projects have a stronger char-
acter of individual projects on a national basis and do not have general 
overarching structure like that of the Mekong River regime (interview 
3.1, interview 3.2, interview 3.4) nor any regulatory functions (Osborne 
2004:7). 
My impression of the regime is one that struggles to dominate the space 
which the Agreement of 1995 has provided. It has the potential, but is not 
allowed by the members to be the policy-recommending body which it 
could have been, and has therefore disappointed many. Nonetheless, it is 
able to make concrete achievements in certain areas, particularly relating 
to collection and processing of information. 
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4.3 The riparians 
4.3.1 Thailand 
Political background 
Thailand, a constitutional monarchy, was never colonised by western 
powers. After being on Japan’s side in the Second World War, she turned 
to the West and strengthened her ties to the US (Makim 2002b:11). Thai-
land was of strategic military importance to the US during the US-
Vietnamese war (Yu 2003:1224), and she has remained allied to the West 
and US since. Her recent history is a patchwork of military coups and 
democratic rule with bloody student uprisings in the 1970s and 1992. The 
current constitution from 1997 is designed to ensure political stability and 
political leadership rooted in a popular mandate, and affirms the right to 
public participation and consultation. This means that prior to major 
public commitments Thailand is obliged to go through a process of public 
hearings and consultations. Her NGO community is more vibrant and 
influential than in the other Mekong riparians (Brady 1993:107; Lebel et 
al. 2005:; Tarr [1998]:6). Although Thailand is a democracy and the re-
sponsibilities for running the country lies with the elected politicians, the 
royal family, and especially King Phumiphon, are widely admired and 
respected. It was the interference by the King during the previously men-
tioned uprisings that brought the conflicting parties together and reintro-
duced orderly conditions. Thailand experienced an enormous economic 
growth during the 1980s and 1990s, diversifying the economy and estab-
lishing herself as a newly industrialised country. However, the 1997-98 
Asian economic crisis had a severe impact on Thailand, reducing the 
GDP by 10,5% in 1998 (Turner 2006:1582), but she seems to have 
recovered since then (Central Intelligence Agency 2006d), and is present-
ly the strongest economy in the sub-region (Krongkaew 2004:980). Thai-
land has a little more than 60 million inhabitants, and approximately 40% 
of the labour force are employed in agriculture, hunting and forestry5 
(Turner 2006:1580, 1584). The GDP per capita is $ 8,300, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity6 (Central Intelligence Agency 2006d).  
Geography 
Approximately a third, 36% (Dore 2003:423), of Thailand lies within the 
Mekong River basin, although the majority of this is in the remote, 
draught-ridden and lesser developed Isan region in the North-eastern 
parts of the kingdom, also known as the Korat Plateau. Approximately 
half of Thailand’s arable land is located in this region (Makim 2002b:29, 
footnote 68). Thailand has made extensive irrigation plans to transfer 
water from the Khong River, a Mekong tributary near Nong Khai/ 
Vientiane, through the Korat plateau and into the Chi and Mun Rivers 
leading the water back into the Mekong River in the very south of Lao. 
The transferred water will be used to irrigate the land (Hirsch 2001:247). 
Thailand had developed all sites with hydropower potential in this area by 
the early 1990s (Browder 2000:242). 
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Political relations to the region 
Thailand was one of the funding members of ASEAN in 1967. She is a 
member of the so-called Golden Quadrangle, the Agreement on Commer-
cial Navigation on the Mekong-Lancang River concluded in 2000 be-
tween China, Lao PDR, Burma and Thailand that aims to make the upper 
parts of the Mekong River navigable all year round. The navigation 
channel was, however, not completed, partly due to resistance from Thai 
civil society (interview 4.5, Dore 2003:428), but officially because Thai-
land needed to establish the boundary (which is the thalweg) with Lao 
PDR (Osborne 2004:27). Thailand has an MoU with Lao PDR from 1996 
to buy 3000 Mw from Lao hydropower dams (interview 3.3, NTPC 
2005a). The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, EGAT, has 
provided the majority of the funds for several dams in Lao PRD, ex-
pecting electricity deals in return (interview 4.5). Further details on this 
are provided 0 below. Thailand wants to construct a regional power grid 
for regional power trade (interview 3.3). Thailand also funds hydropower 
dams in Burma, on the Salween River, and in China (interview 3.5, inter-
view 4.5). Thailand and China have signed an MoU about trade in electri-
city, where Thailand states her intention to purchase up to 3000 mega-
watts generated by the Chinese hydropower dams on the Mekong River 
(Dore 2003:431-2). EGAT has agreed to partially finance some of the 
dams, and the Thai company MDX Power is developing the 1500MW 
Jing Hong hydro project in Yunnan (Yu 2003:1225), which is also sup-
posed to supply Thailand with power (Lebel et al. 2005:; McCormack 
2001:16; Osborne 2004:12). This implies that Thailand recognises 
China’s right to develop her parts of the Mekong River (interview 1.3, 
interview 3.5, Dore 2003:432). However, some of these projects have 
been postponed because of the Asian economic crisis in 1997-98 which 
hit Thailand particularly bad. Despite increasing economic relations with 
her neighbours, there has also been tension resulting in violence the past 
decades. Thailand and Lao PDR fought a brief war on border and refugee 
issues in the late 1980s, and, as Dosch and Hensengerth (2005:276), 
remind us of, Thailand and Cambodia experienced outbreaks of mutual 
hostilities in January 2003. Nonetheless, cooperation may still take place 
at a lower scale. Laotian and Thai villages on opposite banks of the 
Mekong River are reported to have collaborated to request Chinese ships 
to sail at reduced speed, as their wakes accelerate bank erosion (Lebel et 
al. 2005). 
Relationship to the MRC: giving, but not giving in 
Thailand provides technical expertise and capacity to the MRC coopera-
tion (interview 3.2), and has not been as dependent on it for funding and 
technical assistance as some of the other members (Browder 2000:243). 
She would like China to become a member of the MRC, possibly because 
she will be most affected by alternations in the flow regime caused by 
Chinese development (interview 3.4, Browder 2000:247; Browder and 
Ortolano 2000:516).  
Thailand refused to sign the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consulta-
tion and Agreement at the council meeting in 2004, citing her need for 
extensive public hearings, but also suggesting that the procedures were 
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useless without Chinese participation (interview 3.4). The lower Mekong 
riparians will need to adjust their behaviour to the Chinese water policies 
(interview 4.1), and Thailand therefore prefers a framework for the 
cooperation instead of strict regulations. The Agreement of 1995 is 
regarded as adequate (interview 4.1). Browder (2000:257), speaking of 
the negotiations prior to the 1995 Agreement, has noted that Thailand, ‘as 
the regional economic power and relative upstream state […] [is] 
probably not as motivated to formulate water utilization rules as the other 
MRC states’. It has also been suggested that Thailand fears that regula-
tions might restrict her freedom of action, especially related to future 
water diversion projects (Osborne 2004:8). 
Due to the extensive Thai system of public consultation, Thailand re-
quires more time than other MRC members before she can commit to 
MRC policy recommendations and suggestions (interview 3.1, interview 
3.4). 
Thailand has benefited substantially from the MRC cooperation in the 
past (interview 4.1). During the 1960’s and 1970’s, when war and unrest 
raged in other parts of Southeast Asia, Thailand was comparatively 
peaceful and hence accessible to development projects, sparking her eco-
nomic development (interview 4.1). She received funding and technical 
support from the World Bank and the US, resulting in several hydro-
power and coal fire power plants (Yu 2003:1224, 1226). 
Perceptions of the MRC: ‘demanding downstreamers’ 
As Thailand is a fairly advanced country with an established legal system 
and bureaucracy, and a developed economy, she does not need the devel-
opment resources that the MRC can provide (interview 4.4). Thailand 
also has a more pronounced position on issues like EIA regulations, is 
less interested in adapting current procedures to those suggested by the 
MRC (interview 3.1, interview 4.4), and doesn’t need the capacity of the 
organisation as much as some of the other members (interview 3.2). The 
strength of the Thai economy and state also gives her a confidence that, 
together with her position as the upstream country within the cooperation, 
makes her more reluctant to give into demands from the other members 
(interview 3.1). She is sceptical of some of the MRC policy recommenda-
tions (interview 3.2), and finds the demands from the downstream ripar-
ians to be too strict (interview 4.1). She considers some of them to be too 
concerned with their general downstream position, refusing to recognise 
their own position as upstream to one or two other countries (interview 
4.1). Thailand seems for example not to be keen on a detailed flow man-
agement scheme as wanted by the downstream riparians (interview 3.4), 
partially because she claims that this has no purpose without Chinese 
participation (interview 4.1). Thailand and China have a joint interest in a 
lenient water flow regime (interview 4.1). She would rather see the MRC 
as a facilitator than as a body imposing regulations upon its members, 
possibly for sovereignty reasons (interview 4.1). 
Because the Thai parts of the Mekong basin are peripheral and under-
developed, the Mekong Cooperation receives less attention from the 
government in Bangkok (interview 3.2, interview 4.4, interview 4.5). 
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Summing up, Thailand gains leverage and prestige as a fairly rich demo-
cracy with a developed market economy and as the furthest upstream of 
the regime members. She could be well off without the regime, but is 
happy to share capacity to help the other members. She is nonetheless not 
willing to uncritically adopt regime policy suggestions herself, and uses 
her status as a democracy in need of public hearings to postpone 
decision-making on these issues.  
4.3.2 Lao PDR 
Political background 
Laos gained full independence from France under the 1954 Geneva Ac-
cords (Jacobs 2002:357). From 1953 there was an almost continuous civil 
war between groups supported by the communist North Vietnamese and 
groups supported by the US and Thailand (Turner 2006:1030) until the 
communists gained control of all of the country in 1975, and formed Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. The communist government sided with 
Soviet in the Sino-Soviet split together with Vietnam, and has been 
heavily influenced by the latter (Brady 1993:89; Central Intelligence 
Agency 2006c:; Pouvatchy 1986:450; World Encyclopedia 2005a). Laos 
also has historical ties to Thailand (Krongkaew 2004:980). The Thai 
influence is increasing, causing friction with Vietnam (Brady 1993:89). 
The Lao leadership initiated an economic reform in 1986, called the 
jįntanáakąan mai (New Economic Vision), which moved the economy 
from central planning to market-orientation (Krongkaew 2004:981). Lao 
PDR has less than 6 million inhabitants, of which approximately 80% 
live in rural areas (Turner 2006:1030), and more than 75% of the 
economically active population is engaged within agriculture, fishery or 
forestry (Turner 2006:1033). The income per capita is $ 1,900 adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (Central Intelligence Agency 2006c). The 
legal system in Lao PDR is young, as the constitution is from 1991, most 
of the approximately 50 laws are developed after 1991, large sectors are 
not regulated, and the status of international law is not clear (Embassy of 
Sweden, Vientiane 2004:30). The Laotian government is aware of the 
process of public participation that is granted by the Thai Constitution of 
1997 and the manner in which the participation takes place, however, 
there is no desire to open up for similar processes in Lao (interview 3.5) 
and there is at present little popular pressure for change (interview 4.4). 
The country has remained fairly closed and imposes restrictions on civil 
society, although international NGOs have been allowed to work in the 
country (Embassy of Sweden, Vientiane 2004:25). It has been suggested 
that the Laotian government is corrupt at an increasing rate (interview 
3.5, Embassy of Sweden, Vientiane 2004:29).  
Geography 
Landlocked Lao PDR is one of the smallest members of the MRC, and 
the Mekong River mainstream and tributaries drain 97% of her territory 
(Dore 2003:423). Large parts of the country are mountainous, while the 
most fertile areas are found on the plains next to the Mekong River. She 
has an abundance of unexploited water resources, which gives her a cen-
tral position in the future use of the water (Cheong 1998:222-223). Ex-
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ploitable hydropower on the major Mekong tributaries are an estimated 
13,000MW, whilst the mainstream estimations are 8,000MW (although 
some of this is shared with Thailand) (Pholsena and Phonekeo 2004:2). 
Presently, only 671MW are harnessed (Pholsena and Phonekeo 2004:3).  
Political relations to the region 
Lao PDR became a member of the ASEAN cooperation in 1997, and she 
is a party to the navigation agreement, the Golden Quadrangle, for the 
upper parts of the Mekong River where Thailand, China and Burma also 
participate (interview 3.1). The work to make the river navigable all year 
round has come to a halt apparently because of a border dispute between 
Lao PDR and China after a border marker in the river was blown up 
(interview 3.5), but it also refuelled a dispute with Thailand regarding the 
demarcation of the borderline (Lebel et al. 2005). The relationship with 
Thailand has also been strained by border disputes, refugees and Lao 
accusations of Thai support of insurgents (Makim 2002b:35, footnote 86). 
There is some concern that Thailand is increasingly trying to exercise 
economic influence over Laos (Hirsch 1995:254). Some interviewees 
pointed out the investments from Thai private companies in the Laotian 
hydropower sector as a tactic to ensure that the power produced will be 
available to Thai companies (interview 3.3, interview 4.5). It has even 
been suggested that almost all of the output form her hydropower plants 
would go to the Thai power grid (interview 4.1, Boyd 2002:; Usher 
1996:131). The Thai power company, EGAT, is for example involved in 
the Nam Theun 2 dam project, a fairly big project, financed by institu-
tions such as the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the Nordic 
Investment Bank, the ADB and the World Bank’s International 
Development Agency (NTPC 2005b). The Thai MDX group participates 
through a sub-company called GMS Power in a project located in the 
same watershed, the Nam Theun-Hinboun Dam (Hirsch 2001:243), 
which power is primarily destined for export to Thailand (Osborne 
2004:35). 
The World Bank is regarded as an important actor in Lao development 
policies (interview 3.3), and financial guarantees for development pro-
jects by international financial institutions remain crucial (Lebel et al. 
2005). Lao earns a substantial amount of her foreign exchange from the 
sale of hydropower to Thailand (Tarr [1998]:3). She also receives 
investment from China, for example, the Nam Mang III dam is funded by 
Chinese investors (interview 3.5, Wong 2001:28), and China was appar-
ently prepared to provide the necessary financial guarantees for the Nam 
Theun 2 if the World Bank backed down (Osborne 2004:37). Vietnam is 
eager to remain influential in Lao PDR (interview 3.5). A Memorandum 
of Agreement between the two, where Lao promises to sell between 
1,500 and 2,000MW by the year 2010 to the Vietnamese government, 
was signed in 1995 (Pholsena and Phonekeo 2004:5). 
Relationship to the MRC: benefitting but evasive 
Laos’ central position within the basin makes her attach significance to 
the Mekong cooperation (interview 3.2, interview 4.4, interview 4.5), but 
as one of the smallest and least developed members of the MRC, she has 
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less capacity to digest and implement MRC policy recommendations 
(interview 3.1, interview 3.2, interview 3.3). There have, however, been 
some concrete changes within the government, where the initiation of the 
State Technology and Environment Agency is the most prominent exam-
ple (interview 3.5). Laos gains access to capacity from the MRC, and in 
the fiscal year 2003-2004, the MRC contributed US$ 4.26 millions or 1% 
of the official development assistance to the Laotian government (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs 2005:4).  
The Laotian government is occasionally unwilling to give out data 
needed for the hydraulic model of the Mekong River (interview 3.3). 
Sometimes, this is because the data simply does not exist, which applies 
particularly to the tributaries (interview 3.3, interview 3.6), but also 
security reasons have been cited as reasons for not providing data (inter-
view 3.3). It was also mentioned that some private investors refuse to 
share their data (interview 3.3). 
Laotian hydropower politics focus on the Mekong tributaries, because 
developments on these are a domestic matter and does not involve the 
other MRC member states (interview 3.3). These development projects 
are less controversial. Lao depends on international investment to devel-
op her hydropower resources, and is therefore forced to adhere to interna-
tional standards (interview 3.3). 
Perceptions of the MRC: uncomfortable demands, useful resources 
Some interviewees suggested that certain MRC policy recommendations, 
perhaps especially those regarding public participation, are unacceptable 
to the Laotian government. They do not want to adopt these policies 
(interview 3.2), as public participation in their eyes requires more time 
and resources without providing any benefits (interview 3.5). The Laotian 
government may agree to the rhetoric of MRC policies, but are less 
interested in taking any concrete action in some sectors. For instance, 
they refuse to conduct studies on the effects of logging on the water flow 
(interview 3.5). However, given her historical lack of regulation and 
limited capacity, she is fairly accommodating to MRC policy recom-
mendations because they save her from doing the job herself (interview 
3.1). She also benefits from skills within the MRC regarding policy 
implementation (interview 3.2), and is interested in the funding, data and 
competence available through the MRC (interview 3.1, interview 3.2, 
Browder 2000:243). It has also been suggested that Laos does not want a 
strict water flow regime as the countries further downstream would like 
(interview 3.4).  
The financial resources available through the ADB and GMS are import-
ant to countries in a stage of development, such as Lao PDR (interview 
3.1), but the GMS is generally not seen to compete with the MRC in Lao 
(interview 3.2).  
The overall impression is that Laos, as one of the smallest and least 
developed countries in the region, realises the benefits the regime pro-
vides in terms of financial and human resources. She aims to use the 
regime to gain status in the international society, but is herself both 
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unable to influence it and unwilling to adjust to policies that may threaten 
the stability of her one-party government. 
4.3.3 Cambodia 
Political background 
The Kingdom of Cambodia gained independence from the French colon-
ial reign in 1953, but has been plagued by internal conflict since 1967 
(Turner 2006:345). The US warfare in Vietnam in the mid 1960s and 
1970s extended to include Cambodian territory, and after the US and 
Vietnam had pulled out their troops in 1973 they continued to support 
different factions fighting a civil war. The Khmer Rouge finally captured 
power in 1975, withdrew Cambodia from all international engagements, 
and attempted to build the society anew from ‘year zero’. Their policies 
killed more than a million Cambodians through forced labour, executions 
and generally bad sanitary conditions and malnutrition (Öjendal 
2000:170, footnote 1). Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, capturing 
Phnom Penh in 1979, and installed a Vietnamese-friendly government 
that was not recognised by the international community. Fighting contin-
ued in provincial areas as the factions received support from outside. The 
areas held by Khmer Rouge traded for example substantial amounts of 
logs with interests linked to the Thai military (Hirsch 1995:252-253). 
Both Vietnam and Thailand have historically tried to secure Cambodia as 
their sphere of influence, or at least prevent her from siding with the other 
(Brady 1993:89; Pouvatchy 1986:440). However, in 1991, the factions 
signed a peace agreement in Paris that instituted cease fire monitored by 
UN troops and brought free elections and a new constitution in 1993, 
although the current prime minister Hun Sen came to power through a 
coup in 1997 (Turner 2006:345). Cambodia is more stable now than the 
previous decades, yet still plagued by political violence and lack of 
respect for human rights (Amnesty International 2006:; Utrikesdeparte-
mentet 2002:2), in addition to disorganisation, inadequate human resour-
ces, infrastructure and capital (Krongkaew 2004:981). Prime minister 
Hun Sen’s low tolerance for and crackdown on criticism has reduced the 
number of opposition parties to one (Myers 2006:42). However, Cam-
bodia has a vibrant NGO community at grassroot level (interview 3.4, 
Tarr [1998]:13; Utrikesdepartementet 2002:6). The NGOs receive a sub-
stantial amount of financial support from the international community 
(Utrikesdepartementet 2002:6), but is not so much supported from the 
government (interview 3.4). The legal system is still weak, underdevel-
oped and plagued by corruption, especially when protecting the rights of 
the poor (Utrikesdepartementet 2002:5). Cambodia is one of the smaller 
Mekong riparians with only 11 million inhabitants, and fisheries and agri-
culture engages more than 60% of the economically active population 
(Turner 2006:345, 348). The GDP per capita is $ 2,100 adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (Central Intelligence Agency 2006a).  
Geography 
As much as 86% of her territory lies within the Mekong River basin 
(Dore 2003:423), and the river and wetlands system of the Tonle Sap 
covers large parts of the country. Data describing this ecosystem is unre-
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liable or nonexistent (interview 3.3), but the Cambodian people depend 
heavily on the resources delivered by the rivers and wetlands (interview 
3.2, interview 4.4, interview 4.5), as it has been claimed that 75% of 
Cambodians get 75% of their protein intake from the Tonle Sap and its 
waterways (Öjendal 2000:138, footnote 54; or Badenoch 2002:3, for 
similar figures). During the flood season, the lake is an important 
breeding ground for fish, to the extent that ‘when the lake start to empty 
in late October of each year [,] vast quantities of fish pour out of the lake 
at a rate of 50,000 fish per minute swimming past a given point’ 
(Osborne 2004:18). 
Political relations to the region and international actors 
Cambodia has historically been heavily influenced by Vietnam, although 
Thailand also has tried to include her in her sphere of influence 
(Pouvatchy 1986:440, 450). Relations were tense between Thailand and 
Cambodia even in the 1990s, with Phnom Penh suspecting the Thai mili-
tary to continue to support the Khmer Rouge and weariness of Thai busi-
ness interest in Cambodian natural resources (Makim 2002b:24, footnote 
57). Both Thailand and Vietnam had border disputes with Cambodia in 
2000 (Makim 2002b:35, footnote 86). Currently, Vietnam is eager to 
limit Chinese influence and investment in Cambodia (interview 3.5). The 
Paris Agreement of 1991 that led to the readmittance of Cambodia into 
the international society also opened the country up to international ac-
tors. The donors interested in projects relating to water management and 
especially the Tonle Sap have been plentiful, resulting in an enormous 
amount of reports written on this particular issue (Dore [2001]:42; Öjen-
dal 2000:185). International actors such as the EU, FAO, UNDP, ADB, 
GEF and MRC, as well as national development agencies from Finland, 
Belgium, and Denmark, and international NGOs such as OXFAM, 
CIDSE, AFSC amongst others have been involved (Dore [2001]:43; 
Öjendal 2000:185). Öjendal (2000:207) lists four agencies which have 
exercised determining influence on Cambodian water policies through 
their planning processes: the MRC, various UN agencies, FAO, and the 
World Bank. Cambodia became a member of ASEAN in 1999. 
Relationship to the MRC: ambitious demands 
Cambodia is one of the least developed members of the MRC in terms of 
bureaucratic procedures and capacity (interview 3.3, interview 4.2), 
which allows her to benefit from the MRC through access to international 
financial assistance and technical assistance (interview 3.2, interview 3.5, 
Browder 2000:243). Her reliance on the Tonle Sap and its wetlands indu-
ces her to attach importance to the MRC cooperation, and she success-
fully insisted that the natural reversal of the Tonle Sap should be guaran-
teed by the Agreement of 1995 (The Agreement 1995:Article 6 B). She is 
also in favour of a detailed plan for flood management (interview 3.4), 
and the headquarters of the MRC Flood Management and Mitigation Pro-
gramme, the Regional Flood Centre, is based in Phnom Penh. The MRC 
Fisheries Programme, which gathered data on fisheries in Cambodia and 
brought various stakeholders together, has been regarded as a success 
(interview 4.2).  
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Perceptions of the MRC: uninterested and disappointed 
Incidents in the past such as the Yali incident7 have made Cambodia dis-
appointed with what the MRC can achieve for her (interview 3.2). This 
has increased after the new CEO in the MRC took office (interview 3.4). 
There are also some indications that the government in Phnom Penh is 
more concerned with issues such as casinos on the Thai border and 
logging than with the management of water resources (interview 3.5), and 
that it has not been concerned with securing Cambodia’s natural assets 
(Osborne 2004:43, 44).  
My impression is that Cambodia suffers from the aftermath of decades of 
civil war. Her population is highly dependent on the Mekong River and 
adjacent wetlands and she has the potential to benefit substantially from 
the regime, but her current unorganised government is unable to voice her 
concerns. She is only able influence the regime to a limited extent. She 
benefits from the human and financial resources that are available to her 
through the regime, and she (like Laos) wishes to use the regime to 
ameliorate her status on the international arena.  
4.3.4 Vietnam 
Political background 
Vietnam gained independence from the French colonial reign in 1954, 
which also marked the partition of Vietnam along the 17th parallel into 
the communist North Vietnam and US-backed, non-communist South 
Vietnam (Turner 2006:2003). During the 1960s, the conflict and tension 
in the region escalated to a full-scale war with the US fighting the com-
munist north. The US troops withdrew following the peace agreement in 
1973, and the communist forces gained control over south Vietnam in 
1975 where a socialist republic of the united north and south was de-
clared in 1976 (World Encyclopedia 2005b). The country has remained 
socialist since. She sided with Soviet in the Sino-Soviet split, tension and 
hostility towards China growing from 1965 onwards (Makim 2002b:15, 
footnote 31). This relationship is less strained today. The Vietnamese 
government does not tolerate freedom of expression or association (Am-
nesty International 2005). Some claim that the long-term trend regarding 
human rights is positive, with the society moving towards a higher degree 
of openness, but it has also been noticed that recent developments are of a 
negative kind (Embassy of Sweden, Vietnam 2003:12, 34). State research 
institutions play the role of NGOs in Vietnam (interview 3.4, see 
Eccleston and Potter 1996:52 for an example), and the country is opening 
up (interview 3.5). In 1986, the political leadership initiated an economic, 
marked-based reform under state regulation, the so-called doi moi reform, 
which liberalised foreign trade and encouraged foreign investment 
(Krongkaew 2004:981). These policies have been successful at reducing 
the general poverty level and helping those that were worst off through 
reducing the food poverty (Embassy of Sweden, Vietnam 2003:9-10). 
The Vietnamese legal system focuses on stability and order rather than 
securing each citizen’s rights. Corruption is widespread and serious prob-
lem at all levels of society, but moves have been made to counter this 
(Embassy of Sweden, Vietnam 2003:38; McCormick 1998:139). Vietnam 
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has a population of around 80 millions, where of approximately 68% of 
the labour force work in agriculture, forestry and fishing (Turner 
2006:2004, 2008; World Encyclopedia 2005b). The GDP per capita is 
$3,000 adjusted for purchasing power parity (Central Intelligence Agency 
2006g).  
Geography 
Approximately 20% of Vietnamese territory lies within the Mekong 
River basin (Dore 2003:423), most importantly the Mekong Delta in the 
south, close to Ho Chi Minh City. The delta is inhabited by 17 million 
people (Browder 2000:241). It covers approximately 39,000 km2 (Quang 
2002:263) and produces significant amounts of rice both for domestic use 
and for exports (Badenoch 2002:3). It is ‘one of the most important 
regions for economic development in Vietnam’, producing 90% of the 
rice and 53% of the shrimp and fish export of the country (Quang 
2002:263). The area accounts for 27% of Vietnam’s total GDP (Minh 
[2001]:1). During the dry season, the low flow levels of the Mekong 
River allow salt water from the South China Sea to enter the delta, inhib-
iting agricultural production (Jacobs 2002:356). About 16,000 km2 are 
affected by this problem (Makim 2002b:29, footnote 69), with salination 
reaching as far back as 60 km from the coast (Osborne 2004:21). Other 
parts of Vietnam within the basin include the Central Highlands, home to 
Mekong tributaries like Se San and Sre Pok that have great hydropower 
potential, and where there are concrete plans for dam construction 
(Quang 2002:263). This is also where the Yali dam is located.  
Political relations to the region 
Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, overthrew the Khmer Rouge gov-
ernment and installed a government with friendlier intentions towards 
Vietnam. She had thus secured both Cambodia and Lao PDR under her 
patronage (Makim 2002b:20). Her influence in Cambodia could be 
diminishing after Cambodia established free elections, but she remains 
influential in Lao PDR. She is regarded as one (of two) regional powers 
(interview 3.1) that have been contending for hegemony in the region 
throughout history (Makim 2002b:11, 20). Her economy was of similar 
size to that of Thailand (Hirsch 1995:256), although Thailand is bigger at 
present8. Vietnam is, however, insisting on processing raw materials 
herself and resists becoming a supplier to the Thai economy (Hirsch 
1995:256).  
The ADB has financed major technical and economic feasibility studies 
for hydropower dams in Vietnam in the Se San and Sre Pok Basins which 
have influenced the site selection process (Öjendal et al. 2002:35). The 
bank also considered co-financing one of the projects, but withdrew – or 
was forced to withdraw. There have been speculations that the Viet-
namese government refused to accept the ADB’s rising environmental 
standards, which after the Yali Falls incident also included an assessment 
of transboundary effects, and therefore decided to finance the dams with-
out loans from the ADB (Badenoch 2002:27, footnote 17; Wong 2001:43; 
Öjendal et al. 2002:35).  
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Vietnam became a member of the ASEAN in 1995. She is improving her 
relations to the international community, emphasising economic and trade 
connections (Embassy of Sweden, Vietnam 2003:9). She has been receiv-
ing an increasing amount of development aid after the US embargo was 
lifted in 1994, with Japan, the World Bank and the ADB as the main 
contributors (Embassy of Sweden, Vietnam 2003:56, 57). 
Vietnam has expressed concern about the Chinese development of hydro-
power dams on the upper parts of the Mekong River, fearing that this 
may harm agriculture and fisheries (Yu 2003:1230). 
Relationship to the MRC: ‘my right to water’ 
The importance of the delta and Vietnam’s position as the extreme 
downstream of the Mekong riparians makes her attach importance to the 
cooperation (interview 4.4). She is eager to see a detailed flow manage-
ment regime (interview 3.4). However, her human capacity and financial 
resources also means that she does not need the organisation as much as 
the smaller states do (interview 3.2, Browder 2000:243). Vietnam pro-
vides technical assistance to the MRC (interview 3.2). 
Perceptions of the MRC: not accomodating 
It has been suggested that Vietnam has an arrogant attitude towards diffi-
cult issues within the MRC and particularly towards concerns raised by 
Cambodia and Cambodian interests (interview 3.4, interview 3.5, inter-
view 4.6, interview 4.7). The Vietnamese government is perceived as 
nationalistic and unwilling to share information (interview 3.4).  
All in all, Vietnam, with her size, population and regional influence, is 
able to raise her voice in the Mekong River regime. However, as the fur-
thest downstream country, she makes demands that it is difficult for the 
others to accept, particularly when she does not seem to be willing to 
abide by them herself in situations when she is upstream of other ripar-
ians. Additionally, some of the regime policy recommendations are unac-
ceptable to her as a one-party state. She thus has both a strong and a weak 
position within the regime. 
4.3.5 China 
Political background 
The communist, one-party China is the biggest of the Mekong riparians 
with a population of 1.3 billions, of which a little less than 43 millions 
live in the Yunnan province (Turner 2006:436). The province is situated 
in the south western corner of China, far away from the political capital 
Beijing and the economic engine Shanghai, and, according to Makkonen 
(2005), it hosts 26 of the 52 recognised ethnic minorities in China. China 
has experienced an enormous economic growth the past decades, with the 
official GDP increasing by 9% on average every year the last quarter-
century (The Economist 2006:9). However, the level of economic devel-
opment in Yunnan is lower than other parts of China (Makkonen 2005:; 
McCormack 2001:14), as the GDP per capita for all of China is $6,200 
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adjusted for purchasing power parity (Central Intelligence Agency 
2006b), whilst for Yunnan province only it is less than $1,0009 (The 
Economist 2006). 
Responsibility for environmental issues rests primarily with the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and various sector 
ministries (Jahiel 1998:763), with the Ministry of Water Resources being 
responsible for the management and development of water quantity 
(Dawei and Jingsheng 2001:370) through the Water Law (Ongley and 
Wang 2004:272). Major development projects, such as damming interna-
tional rivers, involve the central government and thus give less space for 
the provincial level (interview 1.3). Generally, runoff regulation and 
water allocation projects must be approved by a government one level 
higher up than the level concerned (Shen 2004:359), and national regula-
tions requires EIAs for all new industrial projects and expansion of exist-
ing facilities (Zhao and Ortolano 2003:720). The central government, 
hereunder SEPA, must approve the EIAs for hydropower dams and other 
projects transcending administrative areas (interview 1.1, Regulations on 
the Administration of Construction Project Environmental Protection 
1998:Article 11), and the final decision regarding development projects is 
made at the central level or by authorised departments (interview 2.1, The 
Water Law 2002:Article 17). The national EIA law, which entered into 
force in September 2003, requires all relevant parties, including the gen-
eral public as well as experts, to evaluate the likely impacts of develop-
ment projects and plans on the natural and human environment (Liu 
2005). Provincial governments tend to favour economic self-interest 
above environmental protection (Jahiel 1998:782) and supports hydro-
power development because it normally brings more tax money, in-
creased job opportunities and economic development (interview 1.3, 
interview 2.3). China monitors the flood level of most of her major rivers 
(interview 1.2) and the Water Law from 2002 states that ‘basic hydro-
logic materials shall be publicized pursuant to the relevant provisions of 
the state’ (The Water Law 2002:Article 16). Nonetheless, only certain 
data on the Chinese international rivers are public as the Ministry of 
Water Resources has passed a regulation that classifies river data as state 
secrets (interview 2.110). 
Private companies and enterprise in China are powerful and able to 
influence the central government to favour hydropower development 
(interview 1.1, interview 1.3, interview 2.1, interview 2.2, interview 2.3). 
Corruption also appears to be a serious problem, as, for example, 
‘[g]aining a licence or permit is apt to require a bribe’ (McCormick 
1998:139). 
Geography 
The Mekong River runs through Qinghai Province, Tibet Autonomous 
Region and Yunnan Province, and the basin constitutes approximately 
3% of the total Chinese territory (Öjendal 2000:15), whilst 23,3% of 
Yunnan Province’s total land area is found within the Mekong River 
basin (Zuo 2001:1). The basin area in Yunnan is narrow compared to the 
rest of the basin, and the river descends rapidly through steep valleys and 
gorges, making the engineering of dam construction easy (McCormack 
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2001:17) and the river suitable for hydropower development (Osborne 
2004:1). It has a theoretical potential of 25,000 MW (megawatt), for 
comparison, the Three Gorges dam will have an installed capacity of 
18,200 MW (Magee 2006a:29). Plans for hydropower development will 
take advantage of an 800 meter11 drop over a stretch of 750 km in the 
middle and lower sections of Yunnan (Dore and Yu 2004:19; 
McCormack 2001:15). There are confirmed plans for eight dams, with six 
more proposed (Makim 2002b:37, footnote 94). Two dams, Manwan and 
Dachaoshan, are completed and operating, whilst a third, the gigantic 
Xiaowan with a wall 292 m high and a reservoir stretching 169 km back 
from it origin, is under construction (Dore and Yu 2004:19). When all 
eight dams are complete, the cascade will have a maximum installed 
capacity of 15,000 MW, about 80% of the Three Gorges Dam 
(McCormack 2001:15). 
Political relations to the region 
China is a member of the GMS program where initially only Yunnan Pro-
vince was participating, but from 2004/2005 all of China joined the 
program (Bando 2006). The border province Guangxi became an active 
member working with Vietnam in a similar manner to the cooperation 
already taking place between the Mekong countries (interview 1.2, inter-
view 1.3). The GMS program seemed generally to be regarded as cover-
ing several sectors and important issues (interview 1.2, interview 2.1), 
though mainly with a focus on economic or trade related issues (interview 
2.2). Delegations to GMS are usually headed by representatives from 
Beijing, but there are representatives from Yunnan in the delegation 
(interview 1.3). Yunnan may receive permission from the central govern-
ment to embark on international cooperation through the GMS program, 
even if Yunnan is only a province (interview 1.3). 
China is positive to broader and loser forms of cooperation, such as the 
ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, South Korea), because they usually involve 
less obligations (interview 1.3). She prefers to discuss matters relating to 
the Mekong River within the ASEAN framework (interview 1.3). China 
also participates in the Golden Quadrangle (interview 1.3). There are a 
number of small-scale cooperation projects between local governments 
within Yunnan Province and local governments in Lao PDR regarding 
fire control, trade in forest products and farmer-to-farmer exchange that 
take place independently of any larger institutional framework (Zuo 
2001). 
When the resolution on the UN Convention on International Water-
courses was put before the UN General Assembly for adoption in 1997, 
the vote was 103 in favour, and three against, whereof China was one12. 
This is ‘probably attributable to [the Chinese] position […] as [an] 
upstream state […] in ongoing controversies’ (McCaffrey and Sinjela 
1998:105) and implies that China is reluctant to surrender any leverage 
her position as the extreme upstream country gives her (McCaffrey and 
Sinjela 1998:104). 
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Relationship to the MRC: cooperation with reservation 
The responsibility for China’s relationship with the MRC lies with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview 1.2). China and the MRC have an 
agreement on technical cooperation, signed in 2002 and operational since 
2004, to share data on the flood level on the Mekong River during the wet 
season. The MRC has equipped two hydrological stations at Yunjinghong 
and Man’An in Yunnan, and established a Data Centre in Kunming 
(MRC 2004:104). This cooperation is apparently working to a satisfying 
degree (interview 3.1), although it sometimes proves difficult to gain ac-
cess to data from the Chinese. China has shown little interest in consult-
ing with the downstream countries about her plans for development of the 
river (McCormack 2001:18; Osborne 2004:7-8). For example, China has 
not been willing to allow MRC staff to visit the sites where the hydro-
power dams currently are being built (Manwan and Dachaoshan) (inter-
view 3.3, Osborne 2004:15), although Osborne (2004:15) also claims that 
‘there have been offers to provide a visit to Jinghong’. The flood data that 
China provides to the MRC on the Mekong River is publicly accessible 
data, whilst classified data is not shared. Furthermore, China provides 
data to the MRC on request, but only smaller parts at the time (interview 
2.1), and only at their own discretion (interview 1.3). China has also been 
arguing that her development of the river’s resources, mainly hydropower 
dams, will not affect the water quality (Osborne 2004:15) and that 
downstream impacts will prove beneficial (Lebel et al. 2005; Osborne 
2004:15). If any transboundary negative impacts have been considered, 
they have been dismissed or neglected as undesirable effects of essential 
and necessary economic development (Dore 2003:431). 
The Navigation Affairs Bureau in Yunnan has expressed interest to 
cooperate with the MRC on navigation between the upper and lower parts 
of the Mekong River (MRC 2004:109).  
Perceptions of the MRC: small yes and big NO 
On question, some of the interviewees suggested that the MRC had little, 
if any influence on Chinese policies (interview 1.3, interview 2.1, inter-
view 2.3). One interviewee claimed that the Chinese both understood the 
concerns raised by the downstream riparians, expressed in international 
forums and at the technical level, and refused to take this into account, at 
the national decision-making level (interview 4.1). The interviewee sug-
gested that ‘China knows how to play the game’ to obtain what she wants 
(interview 4.1). 
China is motivated to be an observer at the MRC because she wants to be 
on good terms with her neighbours (interview 1.3, interview 3.1, inter-
view 3.6). At the annual dialogue meeting between China, Burma and the 
MRC, the MRC normally provides for the two Burmese representatives 
and two representatives from China. Nonetheless, China usually comes 
with a delegation of seven to ten persons. This proves her interest in the 
MRC and her intention to be a good neighbour (interview 3.1). Some 
interviewees mentioned that the Chinese government had been increas-
ingly concerned with having a good relationship to her neighbours over 
the last few years, particularly since the change of leadership in 2003 
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(interview 2.1, interview 3.1, interview 3.6). It was also suggested that 
China uses her position as an observer to assess the strength of the coop-
eration in the lower Mekong Basin (interview 3.5). 
Several reasons for why China was not a member of the Mekong River 
Commission were suggested. Firstly, the historical background of the 
MRC as an organisation established to contain communism makes China 
suspicious of the organisation (interview 1.3). Secondly, China has many 
international rivers, 15 mainstreams, and more than 40 if tributaries are 
included (He and Kung 1998:301). To China, the Mekong is not a unique 
case, and she is therefore reluctant to give concessions to the downstream 
Mekong riparians because she fears that this will make other downstream 
countries in other rivers make similar demands (interview 1.3, interview 
2.3). Thirdly, China prefers broader agreements and cooperation to what 
was portrayed as the rather narrow agenda of the MRC (interview 1.2, 
interview 1.3). China finds the Agreement of 1995 too strict (interview 
1.3, interview 4.4). Fourthly, if China was to join the MRC, she would 
have to accept the agreement as it is (The Agreement 1995:Article 39). 
This is unacceptable because it does not pay enough attention to the cir-
cumstances and environment of the upper parts of the Mekong (interview 
2.1), and does not recognise the services that the upstream provides to the 
downstream areas (interview 1.3). Fifthly, it was suggested that some of 
the donor agencies and some of the MRC member countries did not want 
China to participate in the MRC (interview 2.1). Thus, China was not 
seriously considered as a potential member. Sixthly, China has to deal 
with the upstream-downstream difficulties within her own territory too. If 
she had to consider downstream areas outside of her territory, it would 
make matters much more complicated (interview 1.3). Seventhly and 
lastly, the Mekong River is located far away in what from a Beijing 
perspective is a remote corner of China. This makes it harder for Mekong 
questions to reach the top of the agenda of the central policy makers 
(interview 1.1, interview 2.3). 
In my view, China is undoubtedly the most powerful of the Mekong 
riparians. She uses her parts of the river as she pleases, and does not 
recognise the others’ interests for how her upstream developments might 
affect the water quantity and quality. She has no wish or intentions to join 
any organisation that puts restrictions on her control of the river and its 
resources. Nonetheless, she realises the benefits of remaining on friendly 
terms with the downstream riparians and makes just enough effort to 
achieve this.  
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5 A discussion of the effectiveness of the Mekong 
River regime 
This chapter addresses the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime, us-
ing the research questions and the hypotheses to organise the discussion. 
The first part of the chapter addresses research question 1). The achieve-
ments of the regime are explained on basis of the empirical chapter, and 
compared to the accomplishments of the regime during the Mekong 
Committee-phase. Subsequently, the effectiveness of the regime is as-
sessed and related to output and outcome, before the operationalisation of 
the dependent variable is evaluated to set the answers to research question 
1) into perspective. A summary of the main points regarding the effec-
tiveness of the Mekong River regime finishes off this part of the chapter. 
The three following parts attempt to answer research questions 1a), 1b) 
and 1c) respectively, and incorporates discussions of the relevant hypo-
theses for each question as specified in section 2.3. The arguments will 
also draw on aspects of the explanatory framework. A brief summary of 
the answers to the research questions leads the chapter to its final part, 
comments on the theoretical, explanatory framework. This section re-
visits and highlights the experiences where the empirical findings differed 
from the model’s prediction, after a discussion of the understanding of 
effectiveness in the Mekong setting. 
5.1 Research question 1: Is the Mekong River regime an 
effective regime? How?  
5.1.1 Achievements 
The Mekong River regime has made important accomplishments after the 
1995 Agreement came into effect. The riparians of the lower Mekong 
River basin have invigorated their commitment to a joint basin organisa-
tion, China and Burma have agreed to become dialogue partners, and 
programmes or projects in several sectors mentioned in the Agreement of 
1995 have been initiated or restructured to better match present needs and 
organisational norms. More specifically, the construction of the hydraulic 
model of the Mekong River, which required members to submit data on 
water levels and floods on the mainstream and tributaries that may 
previously not have been shared13, is now almost complete and has been 
tested to the satisfaction of the member states. The construction and 
completion of this model is an important step for the management of the 
Mekong River and a significant achievement for the regime. The comple-
tion of the information base on the Mekong River is a similar accom-
plishment, as is the Agreement from 2002 on sharing information on flow 
levels during the wet season with China. Data-gathering projects appear 
generally to bear fruits, albeit slowly.  
Nevertheless, only three of the five Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-
Basin Diversions have been approved, some of them with serious lack of 
detail, as described in the previous chapter. The member states have diffi-
culties with reaching agreement on the level of commitment and adjust-
ment within the regime, as the progress on the guidelines for transbound-
ary EIAs suggests that they need time to come to unity on policies and 
rules. The effectiveness of the Mekong River regime thus seems to be a 
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rather mixed picture, where the members are more interested in providing 
input to create a knowledge centre for their own use and benefit, than to 
adjust to common policy recommendations. The issue of effectiveness of 
the regime overall is perhaps not as much a question of making an effort 
or not, but rather one of in which field and with what purpose the effort is 
made, where the aspects of the regime relating to knowledge and capacity 
generation seem to have a higher level of effectiveness than those relating 
to domestic policy adjustment. But how does this compare to the level of 
effectiveness of the regime in an earlier period, the era of the Mekong 
Committee? The next paragraph will compare these two, and is based on 
the assessment of the Mekong Committee as described in chapter 2.  
Comparing the achievements with those of the Mekong Committee phase 
of the regime 
The Mekong Committee (MC) had a narrower scope than the present 
Mekong River Commission, as its activities mainly focused on the 
engineering aspects of hydropower development, the White report being 
the main exception to this. The current regime consequently has a broader 
perspective as basis for its activities. Nonetheless, also the present regime 
appears to be most successful with activities relating to gathering data, 
although there are some important differences: firstly, the data collection 
is more in the hands of the regime itself. The data is gathered and 
processed in the name of the MRC, and not initiated and led by exterior 
actors to the same extent as in the earlier phase of the regime. This does 
not suggest that the MRC does not hire external consultants to complete 
tasks, but the initiative rests with the regime rather than with UN or US 
related bodies. The present regime is more in control of the processes 
going on in its name than in the MC phase of the regime. Secondly, the 
data is/was gathered for different purposes. The MC phase of the regime 
focused primarily on preconditions for hydropower development, and 
certainly mainly on economic development, thus defining the flavour of 
the basin cooperation. The current process of gathering data focuses on 
producing tools which the riparians may use as a basis for their policies. 
The hydraulic model is at the kernel of this work, as it will allow the 
riparians to estimate costs and implications of various paths of develop-
ment of the river’s resources. This suggests a major distinction between 
the MC and the MRC phases of the regime: in the earlier period, there 
was consensus on the main lines of development for the basin: the mem-
ber states and the donor agencies were jointly enthusiastic about the pros-
pects for large-scale hydropower development. Now, the members (and 
perhaps the donors?) have differing priorities for the use of the water, 
although they unite behind a broad slogan for poverty alleviation. The 
third main difference between the effectiveness of the MC and the MRC 
regime illustrates this: the present regime is trying, albeit slowly and with 
difficulties, to agree on and establish a flow regime, whereas this was not 
on the agenda during the earlier phases. The development of the Rules for 
Water Utilization and Inter-Basin Diversion is the prime example of this 
effort. The present Mekong River regime seems both to be more sophisti-
cated, and more effective in terms of achievement on its own initiative 
than it was in its earliest phase during the Mekong Committee. It is a 
slow and difficult process for reasons that will be explained below, but 
for now it suffices to state that the effectiveness of the current regime is 
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at a higher level, with a broader scope, than what was the case in the 
earlier phase.  
5.1.2 An assessment of the dependent variable 
The majority of the achievements of the Mekong River regime in its 
present phase are output, such as the information base and the hydraulic 
model. Output relating to information gathering and capacity generation 
is achieved more effectively than output that directly aims to alter the 
regime members’ (the target group) behaviour, such as the Rules for 
Water Utilization and Inter-Basin Diversions. However, the Agreement 
from 2002 between the MRC and China regarding data on the flow levels 
during the wet season is output (a rule) of the regime, and has also led to 
specific change of behaviour, outcome. China has been providing the data 
as described in the agreement from 2004. It might be argued that because 
China is not a member of the regime, she is not in its primary target 
group and the output and outcome relating to the 2002 Agreement is what 
Underdal would characterise as a ‘positive side effect’ (2002:5). How-
ever, the Agreement is a formal agreement specifically between China 
and the MRC and it is therefore more plausible to suggest that it is a part 
of the ‘regular’ effects of the regime, even if it has caused a non-member 
to alter its behaviour. It seems as if the effectiveness of the Mekong River 
regime so far has resulted mainly in output, although it also has spurred 
outcome. Whether the terminology output and outcome describe the 
Mekong River basin context to a satisfying degree will be discussed 
further later in this chapter, but for now, this description is sufficient. 
The operationalisation 
The operationalisation of the dependent variable, the effectiveness of the 
Mekong River regime, as the implementation of its Hydropower Devel-
opment Strategy, proved to be more complex than what originally 
thought. Firstly, it only provides insight into one aspect of the MRC. This 
is problematic because the MRC is not funded on a general basis, rather, 
the donor agencies chooses certain programs which they want to fund. 
The availability of resources therefore varies between the different pro-
grams. A program with an abundance of resources will have better odds 
at being efficient than one without, and assessing one program is 
therefore unlikely to provide an accurate picture of the effectiveness of 
the entire organisation. To get an impression of the overall effectiveness 
of all the programs of the MRC would have required an investigation 
beyond the scope of this study. Secondly, the programs interact despite 
their separate funding. For example, the hydraulic model of the Mekong 
River is mentioned in the Hydropower Development Strategy, however, it 
is also a project placed under the Water Utilisation Programme. Should 
its completion be regarded as a token of the effectiveness of the HDS, of 
the Water Utilisation Programme, or of the technical (as opposed to the 
political) cooperation than takes place under the umbrella of the MRC? 
This applies to several of the indicators subtracted from the HDS, and it 
thus proved more difficult to limit the dependent variable than 
anticipated. Thirdly, projects within the hydropower sector require huge, 
one-time investments that at least two of the member countries are unable 
to provide. This opens up for other actors and especially for international 
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financial institutions like the World Bank and ADB that usually have 
their own safeguard policies with which they request compliance as a 
condition for their resources, and hence, the space for policy recom-
mendations originating from the MRC is curbed, as is it effectiveness. 
5.1.3 Summing up the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime 
This assessment has tried to make three main points: firstly, the effective-
ness of the present Mekong River regime is at a higher level than that in 
its earliest phase. The regime has a broader and more sophisticated scope 
than previously, it is more in charge of its own investigations, and it is 
trying to establish rules for the use of the water. Secondly, the achieve-
ments of the regime relate mainly to collecting information and process-
ing data. This is an important aspect of the regime, but not one which 
changes the behaviour of the regime members’ management of the 
basins’ water and resources. Thirdly, the regime has made few achieve-
ments that have led to change in the member states’ domestic policies. 
The effectiveness of the regime could thus be regarded as not very sub-
stantial or concrete. 
5.2 Research question 1a: Why, why not is the Mekong River 
regime an effective regime? 
Hypothesis A: The lack of information and the complexity of the 
ecosystems of the Mekong River Basin limit the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
The last sections showed that the regime does not seem to have signifi-
cant impact on the domestic policies of its member countries, but that it 
has some success in collecting knowledge and developing capacity on re-
source management. These two tendencies are linked because the intel-
lectual malignity, which makes policy formation more difficult and cum-
bersome, also is the basis for the aspects of the regime where most 
achievements seem to be made, the collection and processing of data. The 
qualities of the basin that makes its management an intellectually malign 
issue constitutes common difficulties the riparians may join forces to 
overcome and approach in the context of the regime. The problematic is-
sues of sovereignty and property rights are less dominant in this area. 
Intellectual malignity thus contributes to the effectiveness of the regime 
in a positive way, because it is a problem the members unite to solve, but 
also in a negative way, as sound policies for the basin are more difficult 
to construct. Hypothesis A seems both to be strengthened and weakened, 
depending on which area of the regime is in focus.  
Hypothesis C: The institutional setting of the Mekong River regime 
limits the effectiveness of the regime. 
Decision-making rules 
The phrasing of the Agreement of 1995 emphasises sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity and denies the regime enforcement power, and the rules 
for allocation of water are highly specified in terms of mainstream/ 
tributary and season and restricted in their mandate and authority. The 
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regime has no mandate to overrule the will of the member states and 
compliance rests solely with the respective member governments. These 
weak rules for decision-making prevent an effective regime, a rather 
common situation. 
Administrative/organisational issues 
How does the capacity of the MRC organisation itself influence the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime? Two aspects are highlighted: 
the impact of the head of the organisation, the CEO, and the qualities of 
the organisation itself. The current MRC CEO has argued for a 
fundamental adjustment of the vision of which role the MRC should play, 
from one as a knowledge centre to one as an investment facilitator. Not 
all actors agree with this change, and the discontent with the new vision 
and the leadership style of the CEO appears to have led to some unrest 
within and around the organisation. Dissatisfaction may prevent the 
regime from being as effective as it otherwise could have been at present, 
because energy is spent at other issues than policy formulation and col-
laboration within the regime. However, general flaws of the organisation, 
such as inflexibility and lack of openness to public participation14 also 
affect the capacity of the MRC Secretariat in a negative way. These 
weaknesses in the institutional setting limit the effectiveness of the 
regime.  
Funding 
Availability and source of funding as an aspect of the institutional setting 
may also influence the regime effectiveness. The regime is only partially 
financed by its members and relies on contributions from the donor 
agencies and financial institutions, which provide funding on a pro-
gramme basis. This may lead certain programmes to be more effective 
than others, depending on availability of funds and resources. It also 
means that the MRC Secretariat has to deal with several systems of 
reporting to account for how the money is spent, implying less time spent 
on actual program work. However, the availability of external funds may 
also inspire the regime members, particularly the smaller and less affluent 
Lao PDR and Cambodia, to put effort into the regime in order to gain 
access to these funds. The empirical findings of this study are, however, 
not sufficient to any conclusions regarding the impact of funding on the 
effectiveness of the Mekong River regime, but it is reasonable to believe 
that the availability of external funding, as opposed to none at all, has a 
positive impact on its effectiveness.  
Hypothesis C, suggesting that the institutional setting, particularly the 
decision-making rules and administrative/organisational issues of the 
Mekong River regime limit its effectiveness, seems to be strengthened.  
Hypothesis D: The many years of cooperation within the Mekong River 
regime increase the effectiveness of the regime. 
Underdal’s model proposes that time has a positive impact on the ef-
fectiveness of the regime, because a tradition for joint efforts will make 
the participants expect long-term cooperation, and because the regime 
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will mature with time, providing a better framework for cooperation. The 
‘Mekong Spirit’ has also been cited as reason for keeping up with the 
regime. However, the past of the regime might also present hindrances 
for an effective regime if it causes suspicion and insecurity about its 
purpose, even if the regime framework as such matures. This was pointed 
out in two different cases: firstly, China might be more reluctant to join or 
adjust to the regime, given that one of the reasons for its founding was to 
contain communism. She might be unwilling to cooperate with a regime 
with this background even if it is no longer valid. The fact that particu-
larly Vietnam, but also Cambodia and Lao PDR, sided with Soviet in the 
Sino-Soviet split rather than with China, and created their own socialist 
bloc in mainland Southeast Asia, might enhance the Chinese unwilling-
ness to cooperate with these countries. Strained relations in the past might 
influence those of the present. Secondly, and as mentioned several times, 
the Mekong River regime was mainly concerned with large-scale hydro-
power development in its earlier years, not recognising social and envi-
ronmental issues. External actors, such as interest groups and donors, 
might be sceptical whether the present regime is willing and capable of 
incorporating these issues into its policies to a satisfying degree. This pre-
vents smooth workings of the regime, and restrains its effectiveness. The 
history of the Mekong River regime thus appears to have both a positive 
and a negative impact on its effectiveness. 
Hypothesis G: The other forms of cooperation in mainland Southeast 
Asia limit the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
Other forms of cooperation in the region play an important role in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime in three ways. 
Firstly, they shape the space in which the Mekong River regime acts, 
providing opportunities but also restrictions to the work of the MRC. The 
navigation agreement between China, Burma, Thailand and Lao PDR, the 
Golden Quadrangle, is an example of this, as the navigation programme 
of the MRCS has to take this agreement into account when outlining its 
programme. However, these agreements also form a platform from which 
the MRC might start its work. They limit, but also form a framework 
which further cooperation within the Mekong River regime may be based 
on. Secondly, some forms of regional cooperation might undermine the 
work of the MRC and make the regime less relevant for the development 
in the region. The planning and building of the Nam Theun 2 hydropower 
dam in Lao PDR is a good example of this. There are important develop-
ment projects going on in the basin where other regional and international 
institutions are heavily involved, but in which the Mekong River regime 
plays no role. Situations like these undermine the importance and 
influence of the Mekong River regime in favour of other regional actors, 
perhaps particularly the ADB’s GMS program. The empirical section 
showed that the ADB through this program is involved in all of the 
Mekong riparians. Despite its lack of a legal basis, or perhaps because of 
it, the ADB supports development projects that border or overlap with the 
programmes of the MRCS. This restrains the impact of the Mekong River 
regime on regional development and policies. Thirdly, the bilateral 
memorandums of understanding between the member states, and between 
the member states and China, might weaken the MRC policy suggestions 
and the regime as a framework for cooperation. The MoUs regarding 
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power trade and development between Lao PDR and Thailand is an 
example of this. All in all, it is clear that the other various forms of 
regional and bilateral cooperation that takes place in the Mekong region 
has implications for the Mekong River regime, shapes the space in which 
it operates, excludes it from certain arenas, or forces it to adjust to other 
plans than its own. This mainly affects the effectiveness of the regime in 
a negative way, strengthening hypothesis G. 
In sum, the Mekong River regime struggles to be effective because of a 
weak institutional setting, because of other forms of cooperation in the 
region, and possibly because of a negative image of the regime from its 
previous phases, however, it is able to make accomplishments because of 
the lower riparians’ tradition for cooperation and because the regime 
enables them to deal with understanding and researching the complex 
ecosystems of the basin together.  
5.3 Research question 1b: How does the geopolitical location 
of the regime members affect their role in the regime? 
Hypothesis B:  The downstream regime members act as pushers within 
the regime, whilst the upstream members are laggards. 
The regime members are all very different; in size, culture, history, lan-
guage and system of government, and significantly and obviously, they 
are situated on different positions within the river basin. This seems to 
have a critical impact on their commitment to the regime, where Lao 
PDR and Cambodia, whose territory is almost completely within the 
basin, are more dedicated to the regime than particularly Thailand, but 
also Vietnam, who only have a fraction of their territory within the basin. 
The upstream/downstream dimension is also important, where upstream 
Thailand and Lao are less committed to a rigid flow regime than down-
stream Cambodia and Vietnam. This may be illustrated by a 2x2 table, 
where the upper right corner ought to be the most committed to the 
regime, and the lower left the least: 
Table 1: Geographical position in the basin 
 Location on river 
 Upstream Downstream 
High Lao PDR Cambodia 
 
Fraction of 
territory 
within 
basin 
Low Thailand Vietnam 
These two geographical factors seem to explain the distribution of poten-
tial pusher and laggard roles amongst the Mekong River regime member 
countries. Thailand, who is upstream and has a small fraction of her 
territory within the basin, is a laggard in the regime. She has few in-
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centives to work for a strong regime with binding policies. Cambodia, 
however, who is downstream and has the majority of her territory within 
the basin, ought to be a pusher of the regime. Vietnam and Lao PDR are 
both somewhere in the middle. Nonetheless, the domestic conditions in 
each country determine whether and to which extent these roles are acted 
out. Thailand, the most upstream of the four, and the most developed 
economically, argues that she has the right to use some of the water if she 
wishes, and that the regime should be limited to the mainstream. This is 
disputed by Vietnam, the other regional power, but also the furthest 
downstream, who claims that the water is needed in her delta. The quan-
tity and quality of water is not defined. Vietnam wants a strong regime 
but is not willing to abide by it herself in cases where she is upstream. 
Thailand argues for sharing of benefits, Vietnam wants sharing of water. 
The two strongest members, that both could have provided the regime 
with leadership, seem to have a different perception of what the regime 
may deal with, and both heterogen and asymmetrical preferences for the 
use of the basin’s resources. This makes it more difficult to reach agree-
ment and thus prevents the effectiveness of the regime. Lao is unable to 
work for an effective regime because she is so small both in terms of size, 
population, and economy. She wants a regime in order to ameliorate her 
international reputation, but seems not to be willing to accept all propos-
als, such as public access to participation, made by the other members. 
She might not really want a strong regime, as this could restrict her 
development plans for the many tributaries. Her engagement in the re-
gime is somewhat ambiguous. Cambodia, however, would like to see a 
strict flow regime, but due to domestic unrest, size and political turbu-
lence in recent history, as well as lack of political initiative and govern-
mental concern for sound natural resource management, is not able to 
make her voice heard. It thus seems as if the member that geographically 
has the best potential to act as a pusher is restrained by domestic condi-
tions. Vietnam, the other member which might have been a pusher, seems 
not to be interested enough to compromise with the laggards to fulfil this 
role. Geographical location understood in two ways form the basic divi-
sion between pushers and laggards whilst domestic conditions determine 
whether the potential is to be fulfilled or not. Both political will and ex-
terior conditions play a role in this. The implications of these prevent an 
effective regime from emerging from the weak foundation of the Agree-
ment of 1995.  
Energy and skill 
The member states’ lack of energy seems to explain a great deal of the 
limited effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. They are unwilling to 
sacrifice control over domestic policies and to provide the regime with 
sufficient power to enhance the regional cooperation. Why are the coun-
tries unwilling to put energy into making the regime more effective? Why 
are compromises so hard to attain? The member states all guard their 
sovereignty fiercely, and this preoccupation with sovereignty is rooted in 
the turbulence of their history and historical relations. Neighbouring 
countries have often interfered in others’ internal unrest, or hostilities 
have spread from one country to another. The US-Vietnamese war, which 
spread into Cambodia and Laos, is the most obvious example of both. 
This has taught the political leaders to treasure independence and 
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sovereignty. Equally important and closely linked is the historical 
patterns of influence at the regional level, where the two biggest and most 
powerful riparians in the lower Mekong basin, Thailand and Vietnam, 
have struggled to dominate the smaller two. Cambodia and Laos are 
therefore cautious to agree to policies that bear nuances of ceding sover-
eignty, fearing increasing influence by the two larger. Lao’s tendency to 
develop the tributaries rather than the mainstream of the Mekong River 
illustrates this. The two larger regime members may on their side feel 
uneasy about arrangements that restrict their respective influence and 
create space for the other sub-regional power. This particularly applies to 
Vietnam, as Thailand also bases her confidence and influence on her 
liberal market economy and economic strength, and is perhaps less reliant 
on a political sphere of influence. The historical turmoil and fight for 
influence have made the regime member states value sovereignty more 
than regional cooperation. Concerns about sovereignty have been instru-
mental in curbing the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. 
The differences between the regime members may also contribute posi-
tively to the effectiveness of the regime when circumstances are as diffi-
cult as in the Mekong setting. A high level of skills was predicted by the 
model to have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the regime. 
However, the empirical findings suggest that unevenly distributed skills, 
where some members of the regime generally are more skilled than 
others, might also contribute to an increased effectiveness. The lack of 
skill in some states may lead to fruitful cooperation with the skilful mem-
bers if they agree to transfer and build knowledge. This increases the 
cooperation within the regime, leads to higher overall level of skill and 
may bring on a higher level of trust, all which would contribute to higher 
effectiveness. A high level of skills does thus not have to be evenly dis-
tributed amongst the regime participants to contribute positively to the 
effectiveness, as far as the regime members are willing to share their 
knowledge and cooperate to the benefit of the purpose of the regime. 
Capacity 
The qualities and capacity of the administration and bureaucracy of the 
member states seem to have ambiguous influence on the effectiveness of 
the Mekong River regime. Generally, the model predicts that high admin-
istrative capacity and developed systems of government increase the 
effectiveness of a regime. However, on several occasions it was pointed 
out that states with less developed systems of government and bureau-
cracy accepted policy recommendations from the regime with less fuss. 
These governments may not have the capacity to develop their own poli-
cies, and are more inclined to comply with suggestions developed by 
others. Low governmental capacity may thereby lead to higher regime 
effectiveness. It was also indicated that a more sophisticated administra-
tion and developed bureaucracy often needed more time to organise 
public hearings and consider policy suggestions from the regime. In some 
cases, this could also be used as an excuse to postpone difficult decisions, 
which makes the regime proceed more slowly and leads to limited effec-
tiveness. There are thus indications that low capacity in the regime mem-
bers’ governments may enhance its effectiveness, whilst high govern-
mental capacity curbs it, without the two necessarily being dependent or 
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linked. Nonetheless, further research is needed to confirm these sugges-
tions. 
In sum, hypothesis B is only partially strengthened. Both geographical 
location and political conditions influence the role of the riparians within 
the regime. Those with a geographical location that would induce them to 
be pushers are prevented by domestic policy restraints, whilst the states 
that have the domestic strength to act as pushers do not have incentives to 
do so because of their geographical location. None of the riparians seem 
to take the role of pushers, whilst they all are, at least on certain issues, 
laggards. The regime does benefit, however, by the training and transfer 
of skills that takes place amongst the skilled and the unskilled riparians.  
5.4 Research question 1c: What is the impact of China not 
being a member of the regime? 
China participates in the annual dialogue meetings with the MRC, and 
technical cooperation, where data on flood levels from two measuring 
stations on Chinese territory is transmitted to the MRC during the wet 
season, is established. Intentions to expand this have been declared from 
both sides. The impression is positive, yet the influence of China on the 
Mekong River regime is complex and when the whole picture is consid-
ered, China’s impact on the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime 
appears mainly negative. She has not expressed any wish to become a 
member of the MRC and a party to the Agreement of 1995. She has not 
granted MRC staff permission to visit her development projects of their 
choice, and she has this far not been willing to share flood data during the 
dry season, which is critical for the lower riparians. The annual dialogue 
meetings do not seem to be a forum for substantial exchange of informa-
tion. The provincial government in Yunnan is possibly less concerned 
with the downstream reactions to the development on the upper parts of 
the Mekong River than the central authorities, as they focus on the dom-
estic economic benefits these developments may bring. Yunnan is not in 
charge of the Chinese cooperation with the MRC, and has therefore no 
incentives to improve this relation. The provincial government puts more 
effort into the trade and infrastructure-related projects within the ADB’s 
GMS program, where the province is a member. This suggests that the 
Mekong River regime has limited influence on China and Yunnan, 
because both are unwilling to take requests from the regime into account.  
Hypothesis E: The effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is limited 
because the most powerful riparian, China, is not a 
member of the regime.  
The policies and programs of the Mekong River regime are not pertinent 
to China. Neither the central government in Beijing nor the provincial 
government in Yunnan seem to be interested in adhering to any sugges-
tions from the lower Mekong countries or the Mekong River regime, 
despite the rapprochement since the change of leadership in 2003. It may 
be that the Chinese government pays attention to the lower Mekong coun-
tries in international settings because they wish to give the impression 
that they are a reputable country, however, when put to the point, they are 
in general unwilling to give in to any demands. This situation limits the 
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potential effectiveness of the Mekong River regime. Nonetheless, it is 
one of the preconditions for the regime that has always been present, 
although with less momentum than now. China’s upsurge in development 
activities in the upper Mekong River basin in general and her rapid 
construction of hydropower dams in particular has made her position in 
relation to the Mekong River regime more precarious, and it may there-
fore be claimed that her recent policies have revealed, and perhaps even 
fulfilled, the potential of her impact on the regime. The general influence 
of China on the effectiveness of the regime is negative. Her refusal to 
provide the MRCS with data on the dry season flows in the upper parts of 
the Mekong makes it difficult for the member countries in the regime to 
make accurate flood forecasting and to draw an image of the hydraulics 
of the entire river, and thereby to agree on flow levels within a flow 
regime for the lower parts. Although the limited technical cooperation 
between the MRC and China enhances the effectiveness of the regime, 
the overall influence of China on the regime is negative, which strength-
ens hypothesis E. 
Hypothesis F: The Chinese developments on the upper parts of the 
Mekong River forces the regime members to cooperate 
to deal with the downstream impacts, which increases 
the effectiveness of the regime. 
The empirical findings show little support for this hypothesis, rather, 
there are indications that the Chinese development projects create further 
differences amongst the regime member states. This is because it necessi-
tates a discussion and decision of who has the right to how much water, 
where particularly Thailand but also to some extent Lao feels that the 
countries furthest downstream are demanding too much restraint of their 
use of the water. Thailand has for example been unwilling to agree to a 
flow regime with fixed limits, which is strongly supported by Vietnam 
and Cambodia, because it implies that she will have to be a buffer for 
changes in the flow caused by the Chinese developments, restricting her 
use of the water. Thailand has regarded this as constraints on her sover-
eignty that she has been unwilling to grant. The Chinese development and 
their consequences on the flow regime of the river thus seem to highlight 
the difficulties between the Mekong River regime member states, rather 
than inspire and trigger increased cooperation. Hypothesis F therefore 
appears to be weakened. 
In sum, the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is limited by China 
not being a member of the regime. It is nonetheless uncertain how the 
effectiveness would be influenced should China, as the regional super-
power, join the regime.  
5.5 Summing up 
The overall picture of the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is 
one of a regime situated in an extremely complex political landscape. The 
geographical location and qualities of its members and most important 
non-member determine their respective potential to be laggards or push-
ers, but the domestic political situation decides whether the role will be 
played out. All riparians guard their sovereignty fiercely. Most forces 
work against an effective regime, including its institutional setting. How-
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ever, the regime has made important accomplishments. It has gathered 
and processed substantial amounts of data on the river and its basin, 
obtained through cooperation by all member states. This is a significant 
achievement in a region torn by war and political suspicion, and indicates 
that the regime is effective in areas that are less sensitive and require 
smaller or no sacrifices of national sovereignty. To be a regime with 
overall high effectiveness it still has a few important bridges of peace and 
trust to build.  
5.6 Comments on the theoretical framework 
This section will comment on the applicability of Underdal’s model to the 
Mekong River regime, discussing both what effectiveness means in the 
Mekong setting, and certain aspects of the explanatory framework that 
were found to have other impacts than those predicted. 
5.6.1 What is effectiveness in the Mekong setting? 
Regimes situated in conditions marked by recent war and low levels of 
trust necessitate a different understanding of what regime effectiveness is 
than regimes initiated in more benign situations. This report suggests that 
cooperation induced by the regime, even if it is only to gather and process 
data, should be regarded as proof of effectiveness provided that this co-
operation had not taken place without the regime. Similarly, the defini-
tions of output and outcome need to be reconsidered. Change in behav-
iour of the regime members, the outcome, may not necessarily have an 
impact on the biophysical environment, but rather pave the way for fur-
ther cooperation and perhaps more extensive output from the regime. 
This output may in turn induce outcome that influences the biophysical 
environment. An example from the Mekong River regime might be the 
hydraulic model, which in the traditional terminology would be consid-
ered output. The construction of the model required the regime members 
to change their behaviour (outcome) because they had to provide and 
share information to a greater extent than previously, but this in itself 
does not change the biophysical environment in the basin. However, the 
hydraulic model may be used in the future as a policy tool that influences 
the regime members to change their behaviour, and this change may have 
an impact on the environment. The point is, however, that a change in 
behaviour incited by the regime takes place both before and after the hy-
draulic model, the output, is produced. The purpose of inducing the re-
gime’s target group to alter their behaviour might be to produce or agree 
on something that paves the way for more extensive collaboration. In this 
sense, outcome may produce output understood in a broad sense which in 
turn causes further adjustment of behaviour. The intricacy and sensitivity 
of policies in a politically malign region suggest that it may be necessary 
with several sessions of output and outcome before the confidence level 
within the regime is stable enough to allow adjustment of behaviour and 
domestic policies. Effectiveness at this level may be little, or low, com-
pared to what is traditionally considered effectiveness in the regime 
context, however, the theoretical definition of outcome as change in be-
haviour as a result of regime output also leaves room for this under-
standing. It seems fair to give the regime members credit for small 
changes when the conditions are particularly difficult. 
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5.6.2 The explanatory framework 
Some of the factors in the explanatory framework influence the depend-
ent variable differently, or in a more ambiguous manner, than what 
Underdal’s model stipulates. The intellectual problem malignity can, in 
politically malign cases, have a positive effect on the regime effective-
ness because it represents a common obstacle to all members. It is none-
theless important to note that the influence of the intellectual malignity is 
not necessarily only negative or only positive, and it will probably vary 
with external conditions as well as with the degree of malignity. Whether 
the positive impact of difficult conditions is greater than those a benign 
situation would have allowed for is difficult to say, but it is likely that 
benignity permits a higher level of effectiveness than a malign situation 
does.  
As for the problem solving capacity, the factors time, capacity and skill 
require commenting. A long history of cooperation was perceived by 
Underdal as contributing positively to the effectiveness of the regime, 
however, the empirical findings from the Mekong River regime suggest 
that this depends on a positive impression of both members and non-
members of the regime in its earlier days. The model also predicted the 
capacity of the members to have a positive impact on the regime ef-
fectiveness. This, however, might not be the case. Members with less 
capacity could be more welcoming of the regime policy suggestions be-
cause their government then does not have to spend resources on 
developing policies. Regime members with advanced bureaucracy and 
systems of governance might be less inclined to change their current 
system. These two trends are not covariant. However, these findings raise 
questions about whose suggestions the countries with less capacity adopt, 
and whether the regime perhaps functions as a clearinghouse for the pre-
ferences of the most powerful members. As for skill, an even distribution 
is not a precondition for high level of skills to have a positive influence 
on the regime effectiveness. It suffices that one or a few members possess 
skills that they are willing to share with other regime members. This co-
operation for capacity building will enhance the regime effectiveness, but 
it is uncertain whether its effect matches the possible impact of a high 
level of skills amongst all regime members.  
Nonetheless, the model with a few supplements proved useful both for 
organising the empirical data, and for predicting their influence on the 
effectiveness of the regime. 
  69 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
This study attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of a regime set in a 
complex and vibrant region. The organisation of data and the explanatory 
framework were based on Underdal’s (2002) model for analysing regime 
effectiveness, with the problem malignity and the problem solving 
capacity, hereunder the institutional setting, the distribution of power and 
the skill and energy, as the main explanatory factors. A third factor was 
added to the framework to account for the impact of other forms of 
cooperation in the region on the effectiveness of the Mekong River 
regime. The study showed that despite the lack of a solid information 
base on the basin and a weak institutional setting, the regime has initiated 
fruitful cooperation on less sensitive issues such as capacity-building and 
gathering and sharing information, and engaged the most powerful ripar-
ian, a non-member, in dialogue and cooperation. However, its effective-
ness is restricted by the riparians’ concern with sovereignty, lack of lead-
ership within the regime, and other forms of cooperation in the region.  
The report proposed that when analysing regimes concerned with speci-
fic, shared natural resources such as a river, the geographical location of 
the participants, influenced by the historical relations between them and 
domestic political conditions, determines their roles as pushers or lag-
gards within the regime. It furthermore suggested that in politically 
malign situations, the threshold for effectiveness should be lower than in 
more benign cases because the effort required to achieve the same level 
of effectiveness is greater.  
The geographical location of the riparians and their historical relations is 
the setting of the regime, nothing can alter these preconditions. But what 
could be done to make the regime more effective given these circum-
stances? The riparians could possibly treasure the regional cooperation 
about their gigantic ecosystem more. The regime members need to agree 
to greater detail on what the purpose of their efforts is, and they ought to 
find a way to share both costs and benefits amongst the riparian peoples 
without favouring any nationality or ethnic group. The donors could work 
for more sophisticated coordination within the donor group, push harder 
for results, and be more prepared to withhold resources if achievements 
are not accomplished. And, significantly, the position of the MRC in 
relation to other forms of cooperation in the region must be clarified. If 
its status is not enhanced so that it serves as a clearinghouse and centre of 
competence on the region, it could be undermined by other forms of 
regional collaboration. It is therefore important that the Mekong River 
regime receives support from other organisations and actors that are en-
gaged in mainland Southeast Asia. The donor states play a crucial role in 
this as they have access to several of the other regional forms of coopera-
tion, for example through membership in ADB or the WB. The donors 
must have a coherent agenda for the region, not only towards each actor 
in the region. I recommended that the donors try to influence the Mekong 
River regime both directly, through working with the MRC, and indirect-
ly through other channels and organisations in the region. The donors 
could also engage in dialogue with private investment companies from 
their home states that have interests in the region. The task of enhancing 
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the effectiveness of the Mekong River regime is a challenging one. It 
rests primarily with the riparians, but the donors are important facilitators 
for the process. 
As for ‘the China issue’, it is difficult to know what to recommend. If 
China is not a member, the regime has to adjust to her actions in the up-
per parts of the Mekong River. However, if she became a member of the 
regime, would it make the regime policy recommendations easier to 
phrase, accept and implement? Or would China, given her size and 
political weight, simply force the regime to adhere to her preferences? 
Perhaps it is better that China remains an observer and partner for tech-
nical collaboration, rather than becomming a member. Her dominant 
position is not matched by any of the other regime members, and given 
her plans and goals for the development of the river, it is not certain she 
would contribute to the aims of the regime as they are presently phrased. 
However, it is important that China and the Mekong River regime con-
tinue their cooperation on technical issues, after all, they are all riparians 
in the same river basin. 
The Mekong River basin is likely to change rapidly and significantly the 
coming years. Huge plans for increasing transport of persons and goods 
are about to be carried out, hydropower dams are on the drawing-board 
and being constructed both on tributaries and on the mainstream of the 
river, and all countries are eager to speed up their economic development 
rates, bringing political adjustments in the fairway. This will have im-
pacts on the environment and those who depend on it. How these chal-
lenges will be handled is up to the riparians and their governments, but 
should they want it, they have a basin organisation at their disposal that 
may act both as a bargaining table and a knowledge centre. The choice of 
using it or not is theirs to make.  
Is the Mekong River regime then a paper tiger? Possibly. Its framework is 
far more ambitious than what its members have allowed it to be until 
now, and its impact smaller than what its donors would like to see. To 
achieve sustainable development, the riparians must be more accom-
modating and willing to compromise than they have shown themselves to 
be so far. In the future, it may turn to life, but that depends on whether its 
members and masters are willing to provide it with a cutting edge or not. 
Presently, it appears to be more of a paper tiger than a real tiger.  
But is the regime a white elephant? Perhaps in moments, its members and 
its donors wish it was showing itself more useful and less of a showcase 
for a ‘Mekong Spirit’ that has haunted the regional scene for years. 
However, all actors involved seem to recognise that the regime has a 
function. In this war-torn region, it is after all better that the riparians feed 
and nurse a white elephant together than ride towards each other mounted 
on war elephants. 
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Notes 
1
 The Mekong River is called Lancang Jiang in China, but for simplicity, this 
thesis will refer to it as the upper parts of the Mekong River. 
2
 Makim speaks of the Committee years from 1964 to 1975, and has thus divided 
the regime’s phases differently from this study. The assessment, however, is still 
valid. 
3
 Lao and Thai languages are somewhat similar, and Lao people living in the 
Mekong valley often understand Thai (partly due to Thai TV broadcasting in the 
area). The Laotian script has the same roots as the Thai script, but today the two 
are different. 
4
 The headquarter of the Mekong River Commission alternates on a five-year 
basis between Vientiane, Lao PDR, and Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
5
 Turner operates with absolute numbers when describing the workforce em-
ployed in agriculture/hunting etc for Thailand and Vietnam, but with relative 
numbers for Cambodia and Laos. I have made all the numbers relative so they 
are easier to compare, using Turner’s figures to calculate the values.  
6
 There are several other ways to indicate the level of economic development in a 
country, such as GDP per capita and GNI. I have chosen to use GDP per capita 
adjusted for ppp because I believe this standard of measurement is both acces-
sible and well know, and provides a more correct indication than GDP per capita 
only.  
7
 The ‘Yali incident’ happened in 2000 when Vietnam, without prior notice to 
Cambodia, opened the gates at the Yali Falls Dam in Vietnam, 70 km upstream 
from the Cambodian border. This led to an unexpected flood in Cambodia which 
killed several people and caused material damage (Öjendal, Mathur, and Sithirith 
2002:18-19). 
8
 Hirsch’ figures might be slightly outdated. Turner states that Thailand’s total 
GDP for 2003 was US$ 143.2 billions, whilst that of Vietnam was US$ 39.2 
billions (Turner 2006:1583, 2007). The CIA World Factbook estimates that the 
GDP for Thailand for 2005, adjusted for purchasing power parity, is US$ 545.8 
billions (Central Intelligence Agency 2006e), whilst the same estimate for 
Vietnam is US$ 253.2 billions (Central Intelligence Agency 2006f). 
9
 The Economist does not state whether this figure is adjusted for purchasing 
power parity. Their source is the Regional Statistics Bureau, whilst the figure for 
all of China is from the CIA World Factbook. The dollar-denomiation may hence 
be from different years, but the point remains the same: Yunnan Province is 
amongst the poorest in China. 
10
 I have been unable to confirm this through written sources, however, Magee 
has had similar experiences with this only being referred to in interviews (Magee 
2006b). When discussing access to water quality data, Ongley and Wang 
(2004:277) claim that SEPA ‘appears to be limiting […] what information 
should be made available’ and that a local Environmental Protection Bureau 
(EPB) ‘may, as its option, declare the data to be ‘State Secret’ or make the data 
available on payment of a fee’.  
11
 McCormack claims the drop is 700 m. 
12
 Turkey and Burundi were the other two. 
13
 The consultant collecting the data had to ‘beg, borrow and steal’ to get the 
required data (interview 3.6). 
14
 Public participation does not necessarily contribute positively to effectiveness, 
but given the magnitude of the lack of it in some of the riparians, increased 
participation, for example through the NMCs, is in this context believed to have 
a positive impact on the regime effectiveness. 
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List of interviewees 
This list presents the interviewees in alphabetical order. The numbers 
found in the report do not correspond to this list. Some made comments 
based on their personal capacity and experiences, and the views ex-
pressed by some are thus not representative for the body they work for. I 
have chosen to include their title and affiliation to make it easier for 
others to locate and contact them. 
Chounlamountry, Kongngeun, National WUP Coordinator, Director of 
Water Utilization & Management Division, Lao National Mekong 
Committee. 
Chufamanee, Pakawan, Director, Thailand National Mekong Committee 
Secretariat. 
Dethrasavong, Chandavanh, Environment and Social Specialist, 
Independent Researcher, Lao PDR. 
Ding, Lingling, Senior Regional Economist, Thailand Resident Mission, 
Asian Development Bank. 
Dore, John, Coordinator for Asia, IUCN – The World Conservation 
Union, Asia Regional Office. 
Feng, Yan, Ph. D, Asian International Rivers Centre, Yunnan University. 
Geheb, Kim, Research Coordinator, Agriculture, Irrigation and Forestry 
Programme, Mekong River Commission. 
He, Daming, Director, Asian International Rivers Centre, Yunnan Uni-
versity. 
Holtsberg, Christer, Counsellor, Director of Swedish Environmental 
Secretariat for Asia, SIDA, Embassy of Sweden, Thailand. 
Jia, Feng, Deputy Director, Center for Environmental Education & 
Communications of State Environmental Protection Administration 
of China. 
Jun, He, Centre for Mountain Ecosystem Studies, ICRAF – China, 
Kunming Institute of Botany CAS. 
Katima, Suchat, Executive Director, Management and Executive 
Recruitment Consultants Ltd, Thailand. 
Lazarus, Kate, Senior Programme Officer – Mekong Region, IUCN – 
The World Conservation Union, Lao PDR Country Office. 
Li, Fang, Director, Regional Environment Cooperation Division, 
International Cooperation Department, State Environmental 
Protection Administration, P.R. China. 
Mathur, Vikrom, Research Fellow, Stockholm Environment Institute – 
Asia. 
Metzger, John, Advisor, Water Utilisation Programme, Mekong River 
Commission. 
Schiefer, Wolfgang, Chief, Programme Coordination Section, Mekong 
River Commission. 
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Skofteland, Egil, Chief Engineer, International Section, Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate.  
Sukhsri, Chaiyuth , Professor, Head, Department of Water Resource, 
Faculty of Engineering, Chulalongkorn University, member, 
Thailand National Mekong Committee. 
Yongsong, Chen, Director, Yunnan EcoNetwork. 
Zuo, Ting, Deputy Dean, college of Humanities and Development, 
Professor in development studies, Department of Development 
Studies, Senior Researcher, Center for Integrated Agricultural 
Development, China Agricultural University. 
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